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MORAL CONTEXT AND RISKS OF DEATH 
Dov Waisman 
When an industry poses a risk of premature death to consumers, 
workers, or others, regulatory agencies employ a figure known as the 
“value of a statistical life” (VSL) to monetize the life-saving benefit of 
regulations designed to reduce that risk.  Use of the VSL, which 
currently hovers around $9 million, has been highly controversial.  
While a number of prominent scholars have vigorously endorsed the 
VSL as necessary to the cost-benefit analysis of mortality risk 
regulations, other prominent scholars have vehemently rejected the 
very idea of attaching a monetary value to a statistical human life. 
This article stakes out a novel and more nuanced position based 
on a largely neglected aspect of mortality risk regulation: moral 
context.  Consumption risks—risks of death associated with using or 
consuming a particular product—typically fall on consumers who not 
only benefit meaningfully from the industry but who also bear all or 
substantially all of the costs of risk-reducing regulations.  Using a VSL 
to guide risk regulation in this moral context is defensible on the basis 
of the norm of personal autonomy. By contrast, workplace risks—risks 
of death associated with employment in a particular industry—typically 
fall on workers who benefit from the industry but who do not bear the 
costs of risk-reducing regulations.  In this moral context, using a VSL 
to guide risk regulation is not normatively defensible.  However, using 
the underlying economic concept of willingness-to-pay to guide the 
regulation of workplace mortality risks is defensible on the basis of the 
norm of equity. 
Professor of Law, Southwestern Law School.  A.B. Harvard College.  M.A., 
Philosophy, U.C. San Diego. J.D., U.C.L.A.  I am indebted to Al Calnan, Michael Dorff, 
Bryant Garth, Warren Grimes, Danni Hart, Jeff Helmreich, Aaron James, Greg Keating, 
Hila Keren, Gowri Ramachandran, Ken Simons, Byron Stier, John Tehranian, and Tracy 
Turner for their feedback and support.  Of course, any errors are mine. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Operating power plants, refining oil into gasoline, 
constructing large buildings, manufacturing pharmaceuticals, 
pesticide-based agriculture—these are all prominent examples of 
industrial activities that, despite their important social benefits, 
pose significant risks of premature death to human beings.  
Indeed, one of the defining features of the modern world has been 
the proliferation of industries that deliver profound, life-
improving benefits to millions at the cost of imposing low, but 
nontrivial, risks of death on consumers, workers, or bystanders.  
Not surprisingly, the twentieth century saw the creation of an 
array of federal agencies tasked with regulating industrial 
mortality risks in their respective jurisdictions.1 
Since the first Reagan administration, the dominant 
theoretical framework for federal risk regulation has been cost-
benefit analysis (CBA).2  According to CBA, a regulation should 
be issued only if its total benefits exceed its total costs,3 and 
regulatory levels (e.g., permissible exposure levels to toxic 
substances) should be set with the goal of maximizing net 
benefits.4  Because standard CBA is founded on a quantitative 
comparison of costs to benefits, an obvious problem arises when 
the costs and benefits of a regulation take different forms.  When 
the costs of a regulation are monetary, but the benefits consist in 
1. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), National Transportation and
Highway Safety Administration (NHTSA), Occupational Health and Safety Administration 
(OSHA), and Food and Drug Administration (FDA) are the most prominent ones. 
2. See Exec. Order No. 12291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13193 (Feb. 19, 1981) (requiring federal 
agencies to perform CBA for all major regulations).  Similar orders have been issued by 
subsequent administrations.  See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 12866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51735 (Oct. 4, 
1993) (President Clinton); Exec. Order No. 13563, 76 Fed. Reg. 3821 (Jan. 21, 2011) 
(President Obama). 
3. See MATTHEW D. ADLER & ERIC A. POSNER, NEW FOUNDATIONS OF COST-
BENEFIT ANALYSIS 2 (2006) (“To simplify greatly, cost-benefit analysis (CBA) requires the 
regulatory agency to sum up the costs and benefits of a proposed regulation, and issue the 
regulation if the benefits exceed the costs.”).  For a more technical statement of this point, 
see MATTHEW D. ADLER, WELL-BEING AND FAIR DISTRIBUTION: BEYOND COST-BENEFIT 
ANALYSIS 88-91 (2012). 
4. See Michael A. Livermore & Richard L. Revesz, Rethinking Health-Based 
Environmental Standards, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1184, 1190 (2014) (“Cost-benefit analysis, in 
its most general form, places both costs and benefits along a common metric and supports 
the standard that maximizes net benefits (the difference between benefits and costs).”); cf. 
ADLER & POSNER, supra note 3, at 68 (noting CBA is “a plausible candidate to be the 
welfare-maximizing procedure as against currently available alternative procedures”). 
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the prevention of some number of premature deaths, how do 
regulators decide whether the regulation is cost-justified?  The 
answer is that regulators convert the life-saving benefits of the 
regulation into the same currency as its costs by monetizing the 
benefit of avoiding premature death.5  When the benefits of a 
regulation include the reduction of a mortality risk—and, 
therefore, the avoidance of some number of premature deaths that 
would otherwise have been statistically expected to occur—
regulators have conducted CBA with reference to what has come 
to be known as the value of a statistical life (VSL).6  The VSL—
which currently hovers around $9 million7—represents the 
primary vehicle by which federal regulatory agencies have 
monetized the benefits of regulations that reduce risks of death. 
The use of the VSL to guide mortality risk regulation has 
been highly controversial.  A number of prominent scholars have 
vehemently rejected the very idea of attaching a monetary value 
5. See FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: ON KNOWING THE 
PRICE OF EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING 61 (2004) (“The most significant 
benefits of environmental protection are often the deaths prevented by regulation.  To decide 
whether the benefits of regulation are larger or smaller than the costs, it is essential to assign 
a dollar value to lives saved.”); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, VALUING LIFE: HUMANIZING THE 
REGULATORY STATE 85 (2014) (“We have seen that in order to conduct cost-benefit 
analysis, agencies must assign monetary values to the human lives that would be saved by a 
proposed regulation.”); Thomas O. McGarity, A Cost-Benefit State, 50 ADMIN. L. REV. 7, 
63 (1998) (“[P]erhaps the most significant objection to cost-benefit analysis is the inability 
of economic analysis to reduce the benefits of regulation to dollar equivalents to compare 
with regulatory costs.”). 
6.  See, e.g., ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 5, at 67 (“The standard economic
response is that a value like $6.1 million is not a price on an individual’s life or death.  Rather, 
it is a way of expressing the value of small risks of death, which, when aggregated to produce 
one death, can be called a ‘statistical life’; for example, the value of one statistical life is one 
million times the value of a one in a million risk.”); W. Kip Viscusi, The Value of Life in 
Legal Contexts: Survey and Critique, 2 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 195, 196-97 (2000) 
(“Economic discussions of the value of life almost invariably focus on the value of a 
statistical life, considering an individual facing a very small probability of death. . . . [T]he 
value of a statistical life is a prospective measure that in effect establishes the appropriate 
price society is willing to pay for small risk reductions.”). 
7. See W. Kip Viscusi & Joseph E. Aldy, The Value of a Statistical Life: A Critical 
Review of Market Estimates Throughout the World, 27 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 5, 18 (2003) 
(concluding in a meta-study that most studies determine the VSL to lie in a range between 
$3.8 and $9 million); see also SUNSTEIN, supra note 5, at 94 (“The most detailed meta-study, 
[Viscusi & Aldy 2003,] far more comprehensive than the EPA’s own analysis, identifies a 
central value in the general vicinity of $8 million and finds that most studies produce VSLs 
ranging from $3.8 million to $9 million. . . . (Note that on the basis of their reading of the 
technical literature, agencies actually use a narrow range of $6 million to $9 million, with 
increasing consensus in the vicinity of $9 million.)”). 
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to a statistical life.8  An equally prominent group of scholars has 
vigorously defended the use of the VSL to guide mortality risk 
CBA,9 often while acknowledging the need for further work to 
develop and refine the VSL calculation.10 
This article stakes out a novel and more nuanced position 
based on a largely neglected aspect of mortality risk regulation: 
moral context.  Whether and how the VSL is used to guide 
8. See, e.g., ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 5, at 61, 67 (“Putting a price on
human life makes most people uncomfortable.  It is clearly unacceptable to virtually all 
religions and moral philosophies.  Nonetheless, the quantitative valuation of life has become 
central to recent analyses of public policies. . . . A more careful restatement of the ethical 
objection is that there is no ‘price’ for life because its value is immeasurable.”); DOUGLAS 
A. KYSAR, REGULATING FROM NOWHERE: ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND THE SEARCH FOR
OBJECTIVITY 111-13 (2010) (critiquing the method by which CBA monetizes human life as
“driven by the procedure’s purely individualistic conception of value” and “tolerat[ing]
treatment of statistical victims that would be considered well nigh criminal in ordinary 
contexts”); John Broome, Trying to Value a Life, 9 J. PUB. ECON. 91, 95 (1978); David M.
Driesen, Distributing the Costs of Environmental, Health, and Safety Protection: The
Feasibility Principle, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and Regulatory Reform, 32 B.C. ENVTL. AFF.
L. REV. 1, 53 (2005) (“CBA proponents contemplate comparison of costs to benefits.  To
facilitate comparison, analysts attempt to place a dollar value on the averted harms, such as
deaths and illnesses.  The methodologies for doing this involve numerous highly
questionable value assumptions.”); see also W. Kip Viscusi, How to Value a Life, 32 J. ECON. 
& FIN. 311, 322 (2008) (noting “many non-economists continue to attack the entire concept
of monetizing risks to life”).
9. See, e.g., ADLER & POSNER, supra note 3, at 178-82 (“Pricing life does not
‘cheapen’ life. There are numerous contexts, other than CBA, in which premature death or 
the risk of premature death is priced . . . .”); STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS 
CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK REGULATION 16 (1993) (“[E]very day, each of us 
implicitly evaluates risks to life. . . . We find it worth spending money on an ordinary fire 
alarm system, but not worth installing state-of-the-art automatic-phone-dialing fire 
protection.  We believe it worth installing guard rails on bridges, but not worth coating the 
Grand Canyon in soft plastic to catch those who might fall over the edge.”); SUNSTEIN, supra 
note 5, at 7 (“[F]ar from being preposterous, efforts to value human life (more accurately, 
statistical mortality risks) are rooted in exceedingly appealing ideas about welfare and 
autonomy—ideas that deserve a prominent place in a free society.”); Viscusi, supra note 8, 
at 311 (“[T]he economic approach to valuing life, or more specifically, valuing risks to life, 
is quite different and more legitimate than an accounting procedure based on one’s 
income.”). 
10.  See, e.g., ADLER & POSNER, supra note 3, at 181 (“A different problem with VSL,
as currently practiced, involves disaggregation.  Agencies almost always employ a single 
VSL figure, regardless of the number of life-years saved or lost or other individual 
characteristics.  Perfect welfarist measurement would be more disaggregated.”); SUNSTEIN, 
supra note 5, at 95-106 (arguing VSL should be individuated across different types of 
mortality risks and differently-situated persons); W. Kip Viscusi, Policy Challenges of the 
Heterogeneity of the Value of Statistical Life, 6 FOUND. & TRENDS IN MICROECONOMICS 
99, 117-120 (2010) (discussing variability of VSL based on the magnitude of the mortality 
risk and age of those exposed to the risk); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Valuing Life: A Plea 
for Disaggregation, 54 DUKE L.J. 385, 389 (2004). 
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mortality risk regulation should depend on two morally 
significant features of the risk imposition in question: (1) the 
extent to which those exposed to the risk benefit from the 
industrial activity that gives rise to the risk; and (2) the extent to 
which those exposed to the risk bear the costs of compliance with 
the risk-reducing regulation.  These two features vary in 
characteristic ways depending on the type of risk imposition at 
issue.  This article distinguishes broadly between two types of 
mortality risk impositions—consumption risks and workplace 
risks—and makes a claim about the justifiability of using the VSL 
to guide risk regulation in each case.11 
As explained in Part I, the VSL used in federal risk 
regulation is based on the general economic concept of 
willingness-to-pay and, more specifically, on empirical studies of 
the amount of money individuals are willing to pay to avoid (or 
the amount of money they are willing to accept to assume) very 
small mortality risks.  The basic calculation goes as follows.  
Suppose labor market and consumer studies show that, on the 
average, individuals are willing to pay $90 to eliminate a 1 in 
100,000 risk of death to which they would otherwise be subject.  
This implies that, were the risk imposed on 100,000 individuals, 
the collective willingness-to-pay to eliminate the risk, and thereby 
avoid one statistical death, would be $9 million ($90 multiplied 
by 100,000).  On this basis, the value of a statistical life is 
determined to be $9 million.12 
Armed with this information, CBA can be applied to 
mortality risk regulation.  If a regulation that would cost $20 
11. For a brief discussion of the moral context created by a third type of mortality risk
imposition—environmental risks—see infra text accompanying note 274.  In future work, I 
plan to explore the justifiability of using the VSL to guide the regulation of such risks.  The 
present article focuses on consumption and workplace risks. 
12. See, e.g., SUNSTEIN, supra note 5, at 51 (“With these values, the government is
not actually ‘valuing life.’  It is valuing the reduction of mortality risks—typically by 
eliminating low-level risks, for example, risks of 1 in 100,000.  When it is said that a life is 
‘worth’ $9 million in such cases, what is really meant is that people are willing to pay, or ask 
to be paid, $90, on average, to eliminate a risk of 1 in 100,000.” (footnote omitted)); W. Kip 
Viscusi, The Heterogeneity of the Value of Statistical Life: Evidence and Policy Implications, 
in BENEFIT-COST ANALYSES FOR SECURITY POLICIES: DOES INCREASED SAFETY HAVE TO 
REDUCE EFFICIENCY 78, 81 (Carol Mansfield & V. Kerry Smith eds., 2015) (“The VSL 
pertains to the trade-off between money and very small risks of death.  Suppose that there is 
a risk of one chance in 10,000 to 10,000 people, so that this group will experience one 
expected death.  If each person would be willing to pay $800 to eliminate the risk, the VSL 
in this instance would be $8 million, or 10,000 people x $800 per person.”). 
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million is expected to save a single statistical life by eliminating 
a 1 in 100,000 risk of death to 100,000 people, CBA would reject 
the regulation on the grounds that it is not cost-justified, since the 
monetized value of the regulation’s life-saving benefit is $9 
million, less than half of its cost.  CBA would reach this same 
conclusion regardless of the moral context of the risk imposition.  
By the lights of CBA, the conclusion would follow with equal 
force regardless of whether those exposed to the risk benefit from 
the activity that gives rise to the risk, and regardless of whether 
those exposed to the risk bear the cost of complying with risk-
reducing regulations. 
This one-size-fits-all approach to using the VSL in mortality 
risk regulation is a fundamental error.  Whether and how the VSL 
is deployed should vary with the moral context. 
The VSL is most defensible in the context of consumption 
risks—risks associated with using or consuming a particular good 
or service.13  Such risks typically fall on consumers who not only 
benefit meaningfully from the industrial activity giving rise to the 
risk, but who also bear all or substantially all of the costs of risk-
reducing regulations.14  For example, the city residents exposed 
to a small risk of death from drinking city water containing trace 
amounts of arsenic both benefit from the activity that puts them 
at risk (public provision of drinking water) and, by paying higher 
water bills reflecting passed through regulatory costs, bear the 
costs of complying with EPA regulations limiting the amount of 
arsenic in the water.15 
As explained in Part II, using the VSL to guide mortality risk 
CBA in such circumstances is defensible on the basis of the norm 
of personal autonomy (though not, as is commonly asserted, on 
the basis of the norm of welfare maximization).16  Where the cost 
of complying with a risk-reducing regulation is borne by, and 
divided equally among, the same group of people that is exposed 
13. See Thomas J. Kniesner & W. Kip Viscusi, Value of a Statistical Life: Relative
Position vs. Relative Age, 95 AM. ECON. REV. 142, 142 (2005). 
14. See id. at 145.
15. See generally EPA, No. 815-R-00-026, Arsenic in Drinking Water Rule:
Economic Analysis (2000) [hereinafter EPA Analysis]. 
16. Cass Sunstein has argued that using a VSL as a guide for mortality risk regulation 
in such circumstances (which Sunstein calls “[e]asy [c]ases”) is defensible on the basis of 
both autonomy and welfare.  See SUNSTEIN, supra note 5, at 113-15.  For reasons explained 
in Part II.B, the welfare-based rationale appears to be open to serious objection. 
222 ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW Vol.  71:1 
to the risk, honoring the risk-bearers’ autonomy requires rejecting 
any regulation whose total cost exceeds the sum the risk-bearers 
would collectively be willing to pay to eliminate the risk.  
Enacting such a regulation would amount to forcing each risk-
bearer to invest more in their own safety than they would 
rationally wish to, thereby violating each risk-bearer’s right to be 
sovereign in matters affecting their interests alone. 
By contrast, the VSL is more problematic in the context of 
workplace risks—risks associated with employment in producing 
a particular good or service.17  Such risks typically fall on workers 
who benefit meaningfully from the industrial activity giving rise 
to the risk (because it provides them with a livelihood), but who 
bear no appreciable share of the costs of risk-reducing 
regulations.18  These costs are typically passed through to 
consumers or deducted from shareholder profits.19  For example, 
the electroplating workers exposed to a small risk of death from 
exposure to hexavalent chromium (a carcinogenic chemical used 
in a number of industries) benefit significantly from the existence 
of the electroplating industry, but are unlikely to bear a substantial 
share of the costs of compliance with OSHA regulations limiting 
their exposure to hexavalent chromium.20 
This changes the moral context in an important way.  As 
explained in Part III, using the general concept of willingness-to-
pay to guide risk regulation in such circumstances is morally 
defensible on the basis of the norm of equity, rather than personal 
autonomy.21  Suppose the workplace chromium regulation 
discussed above would eliminate a 1 in 100,000 risk of death to 
100,000 workers.  Suppose further that its $20 million cost would 
be evenly distributed among 1 million consumers in the form of a 
$20-per-unit price increase.  Standard CBA is insensitive to 
whether the $20 million cost of saving one statistical life is 
17. Kniesner & Viscusi, supra note 13, at 142.
18. See W. Kip Viscusi, Monetizing the Benefits of Risk and Environmental
Regulation, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1003, 1022-23 (2006). 
19.  Dov Waisman, Equity and Feasibility Regulation, 50 U. RICH. L. REV. 1263, 1266
(2016).  
20. See generally Occupational Exposure to Hexavalent Chromium, 71 Fed. Reg.
10100 (Feb. 28, 2006) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pts. 1910, 1915, 1917, 1918, & 1926). 
21. Cf. Waisman, supra note 19, at 1265-66, 1269-73 (arguing that the norm of equity 
provides the basis for feasibility-based regulation, which requires mortality risks to be 
reduced to the maximum extent technologically and economically feasible). 
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distributed among the same 100,000 people subject to the 1 in 
100,000 mortality risk or among 1 million people who are not 
subject to that risk.  In either case, the regulation’s $9 million 
benefit cannot justify its $20 million cost. 
From the standpoint of equity, however, the manner in which 
costs and risks are distributed is significant.  In the case of the 
chromium regulation, a safety benefit worth $90 to each worker 
could be provided at a cost of just $20 to each cost-bearing 
consumer.  Equity—a norm which attends to and compares the 
burdens and benefits experienced by each affected individual as 
the result of the action or policy under consideration—would 
weigh strongly in favor of the regulation,22 because it would 
arguably be unreasonable for each consumer to reject having to 
pay a $20 cost so that each worker can avoid a risk imposition 
that is equivalent to a $90 cost.  In these circumstances, equity 
supports enacting the regulation even though, by the lights of 
standard CBA, it is not cost-justified. 
This equity-based line of reasoning embodies a modified, 
individualized form of CBA, one that attends to the risks and costs 
experienced by each affected risk-bearer and cost-bearer, rather 
than to risks and costs considered in the aggregate.23  This 
individualized form of CBA relies directly on the individual 
willingness-to-pay data upon which the VSL is based, rather than 
on the collective willingness-to-pay calculation which the VSL 
itself reflects.24  When it comes to workplace mortality risks, there 
does not seem to be a normative basis for conducting CBA with 
reference to the VSL.  Instead, standard VSL-based CBA should 
be subordinate to the individualized form of CBA described in 
this article. 
22. See id. at 1267.
23. See Dov Waisman, Reasonable Precaution for the Individual, 88 ST. JOHN’S L. 
REV. 653, 676-79 (2014) (introducing and defending an “individual risk principle” that 
determines regulatory levels based on a comparison between each cost-bearer’s share of 
regulatory costs and each risk-bearer’s resulting reduction in mortality risk).  
24. Id. at 697-98.
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I. FACTUAL AND THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
A. How the Value of a Statistical Life is Calculated
Suppose a given regulation is expected to save 100 lives at a 
cost of $1 billion.  Do the life-saving benefits of the regulation 
justify its monetary cost?  At least since President Reagan’s 1981 
Executive Order directing federal regulatory agencies to engage 
in cost-benefit analysis of all major regulations,25 regulators have 
been faced with the difficult task of answering such questions. 
The approach regulatory agencies have taken is to convert 
the health benefits of such a regulation—primarily, deaths 
avoided—into the same currency as the regulation’s cost—
dollars.26  In the early 1980s, the notion of a “value of statistical 
life” was born, and has since been used pervasively by federal 
agencies charged with regulating risks of death or serious bodily 
harm.27 
How exactly do regulatory agencies calculate the VSL?  This 
question presents a dilemma.  On the one hand, the view that a 
statistical death should be prevented at any monetary cost strikes 
many as implausible.28  On the other hand, using willingness-to-
pay or willingness-to-accept as a method for attaching a monetary 
value to life itself is problematic because, except in very unusual 
circumstances, no sane person would be willing to forfeit his or 
her life in exchange for any amount of money.29  How have 
economists resolved this dilemma?  “The answer,” explains Cass 
Sunstein in a 2005 book, “involves real-world markets, producing 
evidence of compensation levels for actual risks.”30  Moreover, 
Sunstein previously suggested, 
25. See Exec. Order No. 12291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13193 (Feb. 19, 1981).
26. See Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Dollars and Death, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 
537, 538 (2005). 
27. See id. at 538 n.9; see also Waisman, supra note 19, at 1299.
28.  See, e.g., BREYER, supra note 9, at 16 (“[E]very day each of us implicitly evaluates
risks to life.  We begin to run risks to achieve our daily objectives the instant we get out of 
bed. . . . We believe it worth installing guard rails on bridges, but not worth coating the Grand 
Canyon in soft plastic to catch those who might fall over the edge.”). 
29.  See, e.g., ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 5, at 68-69; Broome, supra note 
8, at 92, 95; David M. Driesen, Two Cheers for Feasible Regulation: A Modest Response to 
Masur and Posner, 35 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 313, 340 (2011). 
30. CASS. R. SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF FEAR: BEYOND THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE
132 (2005); see also Viscusi, supra note 10, at 104 (“Suppose that there is a risk of one 
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In the workplace and for consumer goods, additional safety 
has a ‘price’; market evidence, involving the compensation 
people actually receive, is investigated to identify that price.  
Agency valuations are largely a product of studies of 
workplace risks, attempting to determine how much workers 
are paid to assume mortality hazards.  The relevant risks 
usually are in the general range of 1/10,000 to 1/100,000.  
The calculation of the value of a statistical life (VSL) is a 
product of simple arithmetic.  Suppose . . . that workers must 
be paid $[9]00, on average, to eliminate a risk of 1/10,000.  
If so, the value of a statistical life would be said to be $[9] 
million.31 
It is important to bear in mind that this method of attaching 
a monetary value to human life is, in one very clear sense, based 
on a fiction.32  There is a huge inferential leap from the empirical 
proposition that an average worker would require a payment of 
$900 to be exposed to 1 in 10,000 risk of death to the proposition 
that a statistical worker’s life has a value of $9 million.33  
Sunstein, in fact, explicitly rejects the latter proposition: 
With these values, the government is not actually ‘valuing 
life.’  It is valuing the reduction of mortality risks—typically 
by eliminating low-level risks, for example, risks of 1 in 
100,000.  When it is said that a life is ‘worth’ $9 million in 
such cases, what is really meant is that people are willing to 
pay, or ask to be paid, $90, on average, to eliminate a risk of 
1 in 100,000.34 
chance in 10,000 to 10,000 people so that this group will experience one expected death.  If 
each person would be willing to pay $800 to eliminate the risk, the VSL in this instance 
would be $8 million, or 10,000 people x $800 per person.  This is the amount that could be 
raised to prevent one expected death.”). 
31. Posner & Sunstein, supra note 26, at 551 (footnotes omitted) (in the last two 
sentences of the quote, the original text uses figures of $600 and $6 million).  Professor W. 
Kip Viscusi is generally credited with introducing the practice of calculating VSL based on 
willingness-to-pay figures derived from actual labor market behavior.  See, e.g., W. Kip 
Viscusi, Risk Equity, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 843, 845-46 (2000). 
32. Posner & Sunstein, supra note 26, at 544.
33. See Viscusi, supra note 10, at 104.
34.  SUNSTEIN, supra note 5, at 51 (footnote omitted).  Sunstein further notes, “it would 
be grossly misleading to offer the following suggestion: The value of a statistical life is $9 
million. It would be much more accurate to say that for risks of 1/10,000, the median WTP 
in the relevant population is $900—or that for risks of 1/100,000, the median WTP is $90.” 
Id. at 95. 
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Obviously, it cannot be inferred that an average worker 
would forfeit their life in exchange for a monetary payment of any 
amount of money, much less a payment of $9 million.35  To 
generalize this point, it cannot be inferred that the amount a 
worker would be willing to pay to eliminate a risk of death would 
increase in a linear fashion as the risk itself increases.  Rather, a 
person’s willingness-to-pay to avoid a risk of death increases in a 
nonlinear manner as the magnitude of the risk increases.36  For 
example, although a worker might be willing to pay only $900 for 
the elimination of a 1 in 10,000 risk of death, she might well be 
willing to pay more than ten times as much to eliminate a risk ten 
times as great.37  Judge Richard Posner has put this point as 
follows:  “[C]ost-benefit analysis values risks, and the so-called 
value of life that cost-benefit analysts refer to is just a 
mathematical transformation.”38 
B. Normative Pluralism
The theoretical basis of this article’s argument is a moral 
theory known as normative pluralism.  Normative pluralists hold 
that moral judgments must be understood to rest on multiple 
norms and deny that any one norm—e.g., maximizing overall 
well-being—can adequately explain the moral rightness or 
wrongness of all actions.39  Normative pluralism allows a number 
35. See, e.g., ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 5, at 68-69; JOHN BROOME, 
ETHICS OUT OF ECONOMICS 180-81 (Cambridge Univ. Press, 2004); Driesen, supra note 29, 
at 340. 
36. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 5, at 95 (“It is plausible to think that people’s WTP to 
reduce statistical risks is nonlinear. As the probability approaches 100 percent, people 
become willing to pay an amount for risk reduction that rises nonlinearly to 100 percent of 
their wealth; as the risk approaches zero, WTP nonlinearly approaches nothing.”); Richard 
A. Posner, CBA: Definition, Justification, and Comment on Conference Papers, in COST-
BENEFIT ANALYSIS: LEGAL, ECONOMIC, AND PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES 324-25
(Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner, eds.) (2001) (noting “people are much more reluctant
(plausibly more than a thousand times as reluctant) to be subjected to” a 1 in 1,000 mortality
risk than to a 1 in 1 million mortality risk). Cf. W. Kip Viscusi, The Devaluation of Life, 3
REG. & GOVERNANCE 103, 106 (2009) (observing that “as the magnitude of the risk change
increases, willingness-to-pay amounts increase less than proportionally and willingness-to-
accept amounts increase more than proportionally”); Viscusi, supra note 10, at 140, fig. 12.1
(showing nonlinear function for relation of worker wages to workplace fatality risks).
37. See Posner, supra note 36, at 324-25.
38. Id. at 324.
39. See William Twining, Normative and Legal Pluralism: A Global Perspective, 20
DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L. L. 473, 477 (2010). 
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of normative factors—including overall well-being, 
deontological constraints and options, equity, fairness, personal 
autonomy, rights, and possibly others—to ground moral 
determinations.40  It further allows multiple factors to jointly 
determine the moral rightness or wrongness of a single action, as 
different factors interact with one another in determining whether 
the action is right or wrong, all things considered.41 
Though a general defense of normative pluralism lies 
beyond the scope of this article, suffice it to say that normative 
pluralism is a popular position among both contemporary moral 
philosophers42 and philosophically-inclined legal theorists 
interested in CBA and risk regulation.43  This article argues in 
Parts II and III that, when it comes to determining whether it is 
morally justifiable to conduct mortality risk CBA with reference 
to a VSL, different normative factors are relevant and decisive in 
40. Normative pluralism is often thought to go hand-in-hand with intuitionism.  See,
e.g., JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 34 (1971) (“Intuitionist theories, then, have two
features: first, they consist of a plurality of first principles which may conflict to give
contrary directives in particular types of cases; and second, they include no explicit method,
no priority rules, for weighing these principles against one another: we are simply to strike a 
balance by intuition, by what seems to us most nearly right.”).
41. See SHELLY KAGAN, NORMATIVE ETHICS 177 (1998).
42. See, e.g., id. at 72, 80-81 (noting possibility of coherent normative pluralism as to 
wrong-making properties when discussing deontological constraints and moderate 
(“threshold”) deontology); Johann Frick, Contractualism and Social Risk, 43 PHIL. & PUB. 
AFF. 175, 219, 221-22 (2015) (proposing a “pluralist account of moral rightness” that 
embraces considerations of both equity and well-being); see also 3 TERENCE IRWIN, THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF ETHICS: A HISTORICAL AND CRITICAL STUDY 690, 906 (2009) (noting 
that both W.D. Ross and the 18th century moral philosopher Richard Price accept a “pluralist 
view” that posits a “pluralism about ultimate moral principles,” “none of which is always 
prior to the others”); Value Pluralism, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (2018), 
http://plato.stanford.edu /entries/value-pluralism/ [https://perma.cc/MK52-AX5R] (noting 
that, in addition to the prominent early 20th-century moral philosopher W.D. Ross, numerous 
contemporary moral philosophers are committed to foundational normative pluralism, 
including Judith Jarvis Thomson, Bernard Williams, Charles Taylor, and Michael Stocker). 
43. See, e.g., ADLER & POSNER, supra note 3, at 53, (“Our position is not
utilitarianism, but ‘weak welfarism.’ ‘Weak welfarism’ claims that overall welfare is morally 
relevant, not that it is morally decisive.  Morality may encompass a plurality of moral factors.  
It certainly includes overall welfare; but it may also include such factors as moral rights, the 
fair distribution of welfare, and even moral considerations wholly detached from welfare, 
such as intrinsic environmental values.” (footnote omitted); SUNSTEIN, supra note 5, at 7, 
92-93, 113-15, 129-30 (discussing relevance of two norms—welfare and autonomy—to
analysis of normative basis of mortality risk regulation); see also Matthew D. Adler & Eric
A. Posner, Implementing Cost-Benefit Analysis When Preferences are Distorted, 29 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 1105, 1106-08 (2000).
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different moral contexts.  The most salient norms are overall well-
being, personal autonomy, and equity.44 
Because normative pluralism holds that normative 
judgments should be informed by a number of independent 
norms, none of which can be fully expressed in terms of the 
others, it makes room for the possibility that a certain norm or 
group of norms should prevail in some situations, while a 
different norm or group of norms should prevail in others.45  For 
example, a normative pluralist might hold that considerations of 
fairness or equity should prevail over considerations of overall 
well-being when an act or policy will deliver tiny benefits to a 
vast number of people, but inflict devastating losses on a very 
small number of people.  Such a policy could be rejected on 
equitable grounds notwithstanding that it might increase 
aggregate well-being significantly on net.  On the other hand, a 
pluralist might hold that considerations of overall well-being 
should prevail over equitable considerations when, for example, 
choosing between a policy that poses a 1 in 1,000 risk of death to 
1 million people (1,000 expected deaths) and a policy that poses 
a 1 in 10 risk of death to 100 people (10 expected deaths).  The 
latter policy could be justified on grounds of overall well-being 
notwithstanding that it imposes a far greater ex ante burden on 
each of the 100 persons it would affect than the alternative policy 
would impose on each of the 1 million persons it would affect. 
When normative considerations conflict, a normative 
pluralist would reach a considered judgment about the morally 
correct course of action by gauging the strength of those 
competing considerations.46  If, for example, equitable 
considerations weigh strongly in favor of a particular course of 
action, and considerations of overall well-being weigh only 
weakly against it, the normative pluralist could sensibly hold the 
course of action to be morally permissible.47  The more difficult 
cases are those in which the conflicting normative considerations 
are of relatively equal strength. 
44. See infra Parts II & III.
45. See Twining, supra note 39, at 480-81; see also Dietmar von der Pfordten, Five
Elements of Normative Ethics – A General Theory of Normative Individualism, 15 ETHICAL 
THEORY & MORAL PRAC. 449, 449-50 (2012).  
46. See KAGAN, supra note 41, at 183.
47. Waisman, supra note 19, at 1296-97.
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As a normative pluralist, it is tempting to look for a decision 
rule or algorithm with which to resolve such cases.  That 
temptation should be resisted, in my view.  The task of moral 
theory is to identify the relevant normative factors that should 
inform our moral judgments and to explain why those factors 
matter,48 not to provide a quasi-mathematical rule for making all 
moral judgments.  Moral judgment in particular cases is 
inherently multifactorial, and, therefore, deeply fact-dependent, 
making a rigid algorithm an inappropriate substitute for 
considered reflection and deliberation when the normative factors 
one has identified stand in equipoise.49 
II. CONSUMPTION RISKS AND PERSONAL AUTONOMY
Commonly, an industrial activity poses a risk of death to a 
group of persons that both benefits meaningfully from the activity 
and shoulders all or substantially all of the costs of complying 
with regulations that reduce the risk.50  Consumption risks are the 
best example of this type of risk imposition.51  Many industries 
produce goods that pose a small but nontrivial risk of death to the 
consumers who purchase and use them.  Automobiles, heavy 
machinery, pharmaceuticals, publically-provided drinking water, 
and pesticide-treated food are some of the most obvious 
examples.  All or substantially all of the costs of complying with 
government regulations designed to reduce such risks are 
48. See KAGAN, supra note 41, at 17-22, 189-203 (distinguishing between “factorial” 
views that identify which normative factors or properties make acts wrong and 
“foundational” views that explain why the identified normative factors are wrong-making). 
49. See Frick, supra note 42, at 223 (“The aim and ambition of moral philosophy 
should be to inform our judgment, by making us alive to the relevant ethical considerations, 
not to abolish the need for judgment altogether”). 
50. See supra text accompanying notes 14-15.
51. However, workplace risks could conceivably exhibit the same structure if all or 
substantially all of the costs of regulatory compliance were met by reducing wages or laying 
off workers.  See SUNSTEIN, supra note 5, at 117 (noting that, with respect to workers’ 
compensation regulation, “nonunionized workers faced a dollar-for-dollar wage reduction, 
corresponding almost perfectly to the expected value of the benefits that they received.”). 
By the same token, some consumption risks might not exhibit this structure.  For example, 
if the costs of complying with regulations reducing the risk of using or consuming a product 
were deducted from shareholder profits rather than passed on to consumer, the risk would 
exhibit the structure of the typical workplace risk. 
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typically passed on to consumers in the form of price increases.52  
When this occurs, the group of people exposed to the risk in 
question is roughly the same group responsible for paying the 
costs of reducing that risk.53  Moreover, these risk-bearing, cost-
bearing consumers typically benefit meaningfully from the 
industrial activity that gives rise to the risk, as they willingly pay 
to consume its product or service.54  These features of the typical 
consumption risk create a particular moral context, one that is 
relevant to the justifiability of using a VSL to guide mortality risk 
regulation.  In this Part, I argue that, when it comes to 
consumption risks exhibiting this structure, using a VSL to guide 
mortality risk CBA is morally defensible on the basis of the norm 
of personal autonomy.55  It is not, however, defensible on the 
basis of welfare maximization, the norm on which mortality risk 
CBA is often defended.56 
A. Example: Arsenic in Drinking Water
In 1996, Congress directed EPA to newly regulate the 
presence of arsenic in publically provided drinking water.57  
Arsenic is a naturally occurring carcinogen.58  When consumed 
in drinking water, arsenic has been found to cause cancer in a 
number of organs, including the lungs, bladder, kidneys, and 
liver.59  A 1999 report from the National Research Council 
concluded that, at the then-prevailing maximum contaminant 
52. See id. at 113, 117 (noting that “Easy Cases,” in which “the cost of eliminating 
any risk is borne entirely by those who benefit from eliminating that risk . . . .”). 
53. HOWARD BEALES ET AL., REGULATORY TRANSPARENCY PROJECT, 
GOVERNMENT REGULATION: THE GOOD, THE BAD, & THE UGLY 4 (2017), http:// 
regproject.org/wp-content/uploads/RTP-Regulatory-Process-Working-Group-Paper. pdf 
[https://perma.cc/535W-WNFE]. 
54. Arno J. Rethans, Towards Determinants of Acceptable Risk: The Case of Product
Risks, 8 ADVANCES CONSUMER RES. 506, 506-07 (1981), http://www.acrweb 
site.org/volumes/5846/volumes/v08/NA-08 [https://perma.cc/242F-4478]. 
55. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 5, at 113-15 (arguing that using a VSL to guide CBA
in this type of case is justifiable on the basis of autonomy). 
56. But see id. at 114-15 (arguing that, in addition to autonomy, welfare provides an 
independent normative basis for using a VSL to guide CBA in this context); ADLER & 
POSNER, supra note 3, at 178-82 (arguing that “the VSL method . . . allows CBA to 
determine with reasonable accuracy whether lifesaving projects really do increase overall 
welfare, given their additional welfare effects (for example, compliance costs)”). 
57. See EPA Analysis, supra note 15, § 1.1, § 2.3, at 2-6 to 2-7.
58. Id. § 2.2.1.
59. Id. §§ 1.2, 2.2.1.
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level of 50 µg/L (micrograms per liter) of drinking water, arsenic 
could pose an aggregate cancer risk “on the order of 1 in 100.”60 
The Safe Drinking Water Act directs the EPA to undertake 
CBA when setting regulatory levels.61  Specifically, the Act 
provided that, 
After determining an MCL [maximum contaminant level] 
based on affordable technology for large systems, EPA must 
complete an economic analysis to determine whether the 
benefits of the standard justify the costs.  If not, EPA may 
adjust the MCL to a level that ‘maximizes health risk 
reduction benefits at a cost that is justified by the benefits.’62 
In its Economic Analysis, EPA noted that section 
1412(b)(6)(A) of the Act allowed it to set the MCL for arsenic at 
a less stringent level than would be economically feasible so long 
as that level “maximizes health risk reduction at a level where 
costs and benefits are also considered.”63 
After conducting a thorough cost-benefit analysis, EPA set 
the new MCL for arsenic at 10 µg/L.64  The annual monetized 
health benefit of reducing the arsenic MCL from 50 µg/L to 10 
µg/L was found to be in the range of $139.6 million to $197.7 
million (median of $168.65 million).65  These benefits included 
the avoidance of both fatal and non-fatal lung and bladder 
cancer.66  Reducing the arsenic MCL to 10 µg/L would result in 
the avoidance of 21.3 to 29.8 premature cancer deaths annually (a 
median of 25.55 deaths avoided annually).67  In monetizing the 
benefit of avoiding premature deaths caused by lung or bladder 
cancer, the EPA used a VSL of $6.1 million.68  To monetize the 
60. Id. § 1.2.
61. Id. § 2.3, at 2-6.
62. Safe Drinking Water Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-182, § 1412(b)(6); see also
EPA Analysis, supra note 15, § 3.1.3. 
63. EPA Analysis, supra note 15, § 1.3.
64. Id.  The EPA determined that the mean cancer risk posed by arsenic at 10 µg/L 
was between .63 in 10,000 and 2.99 in 10,000.  Id. § 5.3.2, at 5-14 exhibit 5-4(c). 
65. Id. § 5.4, at 5-26 exhibit 5-11.
66. EPA’s quantitative benefit analysis was confined to the avoidance of lung and
bladder cancer because these were the only types of cancer as to which EPA had sufficient 
data to perform a quantitative analysis.  See id. § 5.3.1.  EPA determined that lung cancer 
carries a twenty-year mortality rate of 88%, whereas the twenty-year mortality rate for 
bladder cancer is just 26%.  See id. § B.1.7, at B-12. 
67. Id. § 5.4.1, at 5-22 exhibit 5-9(c).
68. See EPA Analysis, supra note 15, § 5.4.2, at 5-23.
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benefit of avoiding non-fatal lung or bladder cancer, the EPA 
used a figure of $607,162.69 
The total annual cost of reducing the MCL from 50 µg/L to 
10 µg/L was found to be $205.6 million, exceeding the median 
monetized health benefits by $7.9 million to $66 million.70  
Although the costs of reducing the level to 10 µg/L were, 
therefore, found to marginally exceed the monetized benefits, 
EPA’s decision to nevertheless set the level at 10 µg/L was 
informed by its conclusion that doing so carried substantial non-
quantifiable benefits.71 
The EPA further noted that the costs of complying with the 
new arsenic regulation were likely to be passed on to consumers 
in the form of price increases.72  The EPA determined that 
reducing the arsenic MCL to 10 µg/L would increase the average 
household’s annual water bill by $31.85.73 
Thus, as Cass Sunstein has observed, the EPA’s regulation 
of arsenic in drinking water exhibits the structure of the typical 
consumption risk.74  The risky activity at issue—the public 
provision of drinking water—obviously provides a significant 
benefit to each risk-bearing water consumer.  Moreover, as the 
EPA noted, the costs of complying with arsenic regulations would 
be passed on to water consumers in the form of rate increases.75  
Thus, the people exposed to cancer risks from arsenic both benefit 
significantly from the industrial activity that gives rise to those 
risks, and bear all or substantially all of the costs of compliance 
69. See id. at 5-24
70. Id. § 5.4.3, at 5-26 exhibit 5-11.  The $205.6 million total annual cost figure is
based on a discount rate of 7%.  Id. § 7.3.1, at 7-2 exhibit 7-1.  If a lower discount rate of 3% 
is used, the total annual cost is $180.4 million.  Id. § 1.4. 
71.  See id. § 5.5.3 (“Were EPA able to quantify some of the currently non-quantifiable 
health effects and other benefits associated with arsenic regulation, monetized benefits 
estimates could be significantly higher than what are shown . . . .”); see also id. § 1.4, at 1-
7, § 5.4.3, at 5-26 exhibit 5-11. 
72. See id. § 6.3.3, at 6-34 (“Household level costs are considered a good proxy for
the affordability of rule compliance with regard to CWSs [community water systems], since 
water systems recover costs at the household level through increased water rates.”); see also 
SUNSTEIN, supra note 5, at 117 (“For drinking water regulation, . . . [t]he entire cost of 
regulation is passed onto consumers in the form of higher water bills.”). 
73. EPA Analysis, supra note 15, § 6.6.3, at 6-35 exhibit 6-17.
74. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 5, at 113, 117 (observing that regulation of arsenic in 
drinking water is one in which “the cost of eliminating any risk is borne entirely by those 
who benefit from eliminating that risk”). 
75. Id. at 113.
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with regulations that reduce those risks.  This makes the cancer 
risk posed by arsenic in drinking water a good real-world example 
of a consumption risk. 
B. Welfare Maximization Fails to Justify Use of a VSL
Suppose the mortality risk from arsenic in drinking water is 
1 in 100,000 and that this risk falls on 100,000 people.  Suppose 
the risk can be eliminated by a regulation that will cost the 
industry $20 million, and suppose this cost will be entirely passed 
on to and equally distributed among the 100,000 people subject 
to the risk, for a per capita cost of $200 (call this example Arsenic 
(100,000)).  If the government decides not to regulate under these 
circumstances, can its decision be defended on the basis of 
maximizing overall well-being?  Although a number of 
commentators have argued or suggested that it can,76 a close 
analysis suggests otherwise. 
Suppose that the most that any of the 100,000 people subject 
to the arsenic risk would be willing to pay to avoid a 1 in 100,000 
mortality risk is $90.  Most people will agree that this fact shows 
that each person would prefer bearing the 1 in 100,000 risk to 
bearing the $200 cost, which in turn arguably shows that 
imposing the risk rather than the cost would leave each person 
better off.  One might posit that these facts have a clear 
implication for overall well-being, namely, that imposing the $20 
million cost on the group of 100,000 risk-bearers would leave the 
group worse off than would imposing a 1 in 100,000 risk on the 
group.  One might then infer, on this basis, that enacting the 
regulation—and thereby imposing the cost rather than the risk—
would be normatively indefensible.  Here is the argument laid out 
in steps: 
Individual Willingness-to-Pay: The most that any of these 
100,000 people would be willing to pay to eliminate the 1 in 
100,000 risk of death facing them is $90. 
Individual Preference: Therefore, each person would 
prefer bearing a 1 in 100,000 risk to bearing a $200 cost. 
76. See, e.g., ADLER & POSNER, supra note 3, at 178-82; SUNSTEIN, supra note 5, at
92, 113-15, 127-30; cf. Adler & Posner, supra note 43, at 1110-11. 
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Individual Well-being: Therefore, imposing a 1 in 100,000 
risk, rather than a $200 cost on each, person would leave each 
person better off.77 
Overall Well-being: Therefore, imposing the risk rather 
than the cost would leave the entire group of 100,000 affected 
persons better off.  Thus, overall well-being—the aggregate well-
being of all affected persons—would be greater in a world in 
which the risk is imposed than it would be in a world in which the 
cost is imposed. 
Normative Conclusion: Therefore, it is normatively 
indefensible to impose the cost. 
There might be reason to question the move from step 2 to 
step 3.  People’s preferences might be irrational or ill-informed, 
such that the course of action they prefer is not the course of 
action that maximizes their welfare.78  There also might be reason 
to question the move from step 4 to step 5.  Another norm—such 
as equity or autonomy—might make it normatively defensible to 
impose the cost rather than the risk notwithstanding that overall 
well-being would be greater if the risk were imposed rather than 
the cost.79 
But the move I want to focus on is the move from step 3 to 
step 4.  From an ex ante point of view, each person is better off 
bearing the risk than bearing the cost.  For each person, bearing 
the risk is equivalent to bearing a $90 cost, whereas eliminating 
the risk requires each person to bear a $200 cost.  If the risk is 
imposed, society bears a total cost of $9 million, whereas if the 
cost is imposed and the risk eliminated, society bears a total cost 
of $20 million.  Thus, from an ex ante point of view, overall well-
being is greater if the risk, rather than the cost, is imposed. 
However, even if all of that is true, it does not seem to follow 
that, all things considered, overall well-being is greater if the risk 
is imposed instead of the cost.  That is because the analysis thus 
77. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 5, at 92 (“Suppose that people are willing to pay $60, 
but no more, to eliminate a risk of 1/100,000.  If so, then it might be assumed that their 
welfare is increased by asking them to pay that amount—and that their welfare is decreased 
by asking them to pay more.”). 
78. See, e.g., id. at 118-22 (discussing phenomena of “miswanting” and informational
and behavioral market failures); Adler & Posner, supra note 43, at 1116-22 (discussing 
phenomena of uninformed preferences, adaptive preferences, and objectively bad 
preferences). 
79. See supra Part I.B (discussing normative pluralism).
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far has focused only on ex ante effects on welfare, but has ignored 
ex post effects. 
When a 1 in 100,000 risk of death is imposed on 100,000 
people, two welfare-related losses would be expected to occur, 
one ex ante and one ex post.80  Ex ante, each of the 100,000 people 
exposed to the risk experiences a welfare-related loss81 just by 
virtue of the imposition of the risk.  By hypothesis, this loss is 
equivalent to the loss associated with paying a $90 monetary cost, 
as each person would be willing to pay that much to avoid the risk 
at issue.  But in addition, one unlucky person is expected to die if 
the risk is imposed.  The welfare loss associated with this ex post 
effect of the risk imposition—one expected death—seems to get 
ignored in the move from step 3 to step 4 in the five-step argument 
laid about above.  The argument sensibly deploys willingness-to-
pay to capture the welfare effect of the risk’s imposition on 
100,000 people, but fails to take account of the welfare effect of 
the risk’s expected materialization in the death of a single person. 
I am certainly not the first to lodge this critique of the welfare 
maximization justification for the VSL.  Matthew Adler has 
observed that the critique originated with a 1978 article by the 
philosopher John Broome.82  Adler describes Broome’s critique 
as follows: 
Imagine the government must choose between two 
outcomes: the status quo, and an outcome in which (1) 
exactly one person will die; (2) one million persons are at 
risk of suffering this death; and (3) other benefits, valued at 
$B, are realized. . . . Each person Pi, out of the million 
persons at risk of dying, would be willing to accept some 
amount Vi as compensation for his one-in-one-million risk.  
80. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 5, at 92.
81. Id.; Frank Ackerman & Lisa Heinzerling, Pricing the Priceless: Cost-Benefit
Analysis of Environmental Protection, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1553, 1565 (2002) (“In 
acknowledging the monetary value of reducing risk, economic analysts have contributed to 
our growing awareness that life-threatening risk itself—and not just the end result of such 
risk, death—is an injury.”); see also Posner, supra note 36, at 324-25 (noting the “ex ante” 
costs” of projects that impose risks of death and suggesting that ex ante costs can differ even 
when ex post costs are identical).  It may be more appropriate, technically, to think of the 
imposition of a small risk of death as involving a setback to a welfare-related interest of the 
risk-bearer rather than an actual welfare loss to the risk-bearer. (I thank Johann Frick for 
impressing this distinction on me during a conversation in early 2014.) For the sake of 
simplicity, I will continue to refer to this as a “welfare loss.” 
82. See generally Broome, supra note 8.
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These (small) monetary amounts can be aggregated to 
produce an overall cost figure $C = ∑Vi. . . . On an ex post 
view there seem to be two kinds of harm here, not one.  First, 
each of the million suffers a risk of death; and that harm, 
cumulatively, is captured by ∑Vi.  Second, and quite 
separately, the person who will die is very seriously harmed: 
his life is shortened, and (in the typical case) the balance of 
welfare goods realized over the course of his life will be 
much lower.  But this second harm is, apparently, ignored 
when the total cost of the policy is set equal to ∑Vi.  If ∑Vi 
is, in some way, a measure of this second harm, then 
shouldn’t the total cost of the policy be set equal to 2*∑Vi?83 
Now, it is of course true that, due to the stochastic nature of 
risk, it is expected, but not certain, that one person will die.  There 
is a significant chance that the imposition of a 1 in 100,000 
mortality risk on 100,000 people will not result in a death.84  
However, it is more likely than not that at least one person will 
die, and there is a significant possibility that more than one person 
will die.85  In light of these probabilities, any determination of the 
likely effect of the risk imposition on overall well-being needs to 
take account of, among other things, the effect that an actual death 
would have on overall well-being. 
83. Matthew D. Adler, Risk, Death, and Time: A Comment on Judge Williams’
Defense of Cost-Benefit Analysis, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 271, 282-83 (2001) (emphasis added); 
see also Lisa Heinzerling, The Rights of Statistical People, 24 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 189, 
203-206 (2000) (“One way in which analysts treat the valuation of risk as equivalent to a
valuation of life is that they do not calculate the value of both statistical life and life itself.
They calculate only the value of statistical life . . . . The value of a discrete risk, however, 
remains the same regardless of whether anyone actually ends up dying as a result of that risk.  
Risk and death are two separate injuries.” (footnote omitted)); see also Ackerman & 
Heinzerling, supra note 81, at 1564-65 (“In practice, however, analysts often ignore the 
distinction between valuing risk and valuing life.  Many regulations reduce risk for a large 
number of people and avoid actual death for a much smaller number.  A complete cost-
benefit analysis should, therefore, include valuation of both of these benefits.  However, the 
standard practice is to calculate a value only for ‘statistical’ life and to ignore life itself.” 
(footnote omitted)). 
84. As to each risk-bearer, there is a 99.999% (.99999/1) chance that the imposition 
will not result in death.  Thus, the chance that the risk imposition will not result in any risk-
bearer’s death is therefore .99999100,000 or roughly 36.8%.  
85. Imposing a 1 in 100,000 risk of death on 100,000 people creates roughly a 63.2% 
chance of at least one death (1 - .99999100,000).  The chance that exactly one death will occur 
is roughly 36.8% (.99999 99,999 x (.00001) x (100,000)), while the chance that two or more 
deaths will occur is roughly 26.4%. 
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When the welfare setback associated with the one expected 
death is added to the welfare setback associated with the 
imposition of a 1 in 100,000 risk of death on 100,000 people, it is 
not at all clear that, all things considered, imposing the risk would 
leave everyone better off than imposing the $20 million cost 
would.  But this is precisely what is claimed in step 4 of the above 
argument.  In the unlikely (but possible) event that the risk 
imposition did not result in anyone’s death, then it is plausible 
that imposing the risk rather than the cost turned out to be the 
welfare-maximizing course of action.86  This follows 
straightforwardly from step 3 of the argument: if each person is 
better off being exposed to the risk than paying the cost, then 
imposing the risk maximizes overall well-being assuming the 
only welfare-related loss that occurs is that associated with the 
mere imposition of the risk.87  However, in the considerably more 
likely event that the risk imposition materializes in at least one 
death, the truth of the claim made in step 3 of the argument does 
not entail the truth of the claim made in step 4. 
Against this conclusion, Matthew Adler and Eric Posner 
have argued that the welfare loss associated with death itself does 
get captured in the move from step 3 to step 4.  Claiming that “the 
overall-welfare loss in premature death is not infinite, but the 
finite difference between a longer and shorter life history,” they 
argue that the VSL represents a plausible monetization of this 
finite welfare loss based on a person’s willingness-to-pay to avoid 
very small mortality risks.88  Adler and Posner concede that using 
willingness-to-pay or willingness-to-accept as a measure of well-
being breaks down when it comes to avoiding certain death, since 
a rational person would be willing to pay all of their wealth to 
avoid premature death and would be willing to accept only an 
infinite amount of money to succumb to premature death, 
86. ADLER & POSNER, supra note 3, at 179.
87. See id. at 180.
88. See id. at 179-180; see also John Broome, Cost-Benefit Analysis and Population, 
in COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS: LEGAL, ECONOMIC, AND PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES 117, 
122 (Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner, eds., 2001) (“When a person’s life is saved, she 
lives a longer life than she would have lived.  The benefit to her is the difference between 
the goodness, or value, of her longer life and the goodness, or value, of the shorter life she 
would have lived.  Conversely, if an event kills a person, the harm done her is the difference 
between the value of the longer life she would have lived and the value of the shorter life she 
actually lives.”). 
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notwithstanding that the welfare loss associated with premature 
death is finite.89  In their view, “[t]he VSL method avoids this 
problem, by translating” the welfare loss associated with 
premature death “into dollars at an ordinary, ‘premortem’ rate 
rather than the postmortem rate.”90  This “premortem” conversion 
rate between welfare and dollars is the rate that would determine 
a person’s willingness-to-pay for “marginal nonlongevity 
changes to his welfare . . . (such as small changes in consumption, 
in pleasurable or painful experiences, or the provision of some 
public good) . . . .”91 
Although the premortem conversion rate is supposed to 
apply to “marginal nonlongevity” welfare changes—that is, 
welfare changes not related to premature death—Adler and 
Posner nevertheless attempt to derive this rate from a person’s 
willingness-to-pay to avoid a small risk of premature death.92  
Adler and Posner reason that if a person is willing to pay $90 to 
avoid a 1 in 100,000 risk of premature death, this implies that: 
k  x  ∆U  x  1/r  =  $90 
where k is the premortem conversion rate between welfare and 
dollars, ∆U is the welfare loss associated with premature death, 
and 1/r is the probability of premature death occurring (here, 
1/100,000).93  Multiplying both sides of this equation by r, Adler 
and Posner obtain the following result: 
k  x  ∆U  =  $9 million.94 
According to Adler and Posner, k x ∆U represents “the utility 
difference between the shorter life . . . and the longer life . . . 
converted into dollars at rate k.”95  If this is correct, the $9 million 
VSL does represent an accurate monetization of the welfare loss 
associated with premature death.  In that case, a regulation that 
would cost $20 million but prevent only one premature death 
89.  See ADLER & POSNER, supra note 3, at 180 (“Absent a bequest function, the dying
individual asked about WTP/WTA at the moment before death would pay his entire wealth 





94. See ADLER & POSNER, supra note 3, at 180.
95. See id.
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would decrease overall well-being and could therefore be rejected 
on welfare maximization grounds.96 
There are two problems with this argument, however.  First, 
because willingness-to-pay to avoid mortality risks increases in a 
nonlinear fashion as the magnitude of the mortality risk 
increases,97 Adler and Posner’s approach leads to the arbitrary 
result that the value of k  x ∆U  varies with the magnitude of the 
mortality risk (1/r) upon which the willingness-to-pay calculation 
is based.  For example, a person who would be willing to pay $90 
to avoid a mortality risk of 1 in 100,000 might well be willing to 
pay significantly more than 100 times as much money ($9,000) to 
avoid a mortality risk 100 times as great (1 in 1,000).  If someone 
were willing to pay $20,000 to avoid a mortality risk of 1 in 1,000, 
this would yield a value of $20 million for k x ∆U.98  Why should 
the $9 million figure generated by Adler and Posner’s analysis 
when r is set at 100,000 be preferred to the $20 million figure that 
is generated when r is set at 1,000?  Both risks are low enough to 
deliver only the sort of “small” or “marginal” changes to welfare 
Adler and Posner are concerned with, yet they would likely yield 
significantly different results for the VSL.99 
96. See id. (“So the VSL method is not just an arbitrary device to avoid infinite dollar
valuations.  Because it translates the utility loss that occurs with an individual’s premature 
death into dollars by using a utility-to-dollar conversion factor proximate to the conversion 
factor implicit in WTP/WTA for welfare impacts other than premature death, this technique 
allows CBA to determine with reasonable accuracy whether lifesaving projects really do 
increase overall welfare, given their additional welfare effects (for example, compliance 
costs).” (emphasis added)). 
97. See sources cited supra note 35-38.
98.  The converse nonlinear phenomenon occurs as the magnitude of the risk decreases
to a level close to zero.  For example, although a person might be willing to pay $90 to avoid 
a 1 in 100,000 mortality risk, she might well be willing to pay less than a tenth as much ($9) 
to avoid a risk a tenth as great (1 in 1 million). 
99.  In earlier work, Adler himself seemed to recognize the force of this objection.  See 
Adler, supra note 83, at 284 (“Where one person out of a very large population is certain to 
die, each person’s Vi might equal zero, and then ∑Vi will equal zero—which can hardly be 
an accurate measure of the welfare loss that will befall the one person who ends up dying.  
In general, if we imagine one person out of a population dying, with the size of the population 
varying, the ∑Vi will presumably vary as well—and yet the (ex post) harm from the death 
remains the same.  Why take this invariant harm to be accurately measured by the variable 
∑Vi.?”); see also Broome, supra note 8, at 93 (“There may be a very small degree of 
probability which people do not distinguish from no chance at all, so they will accept the 
chance of being killed without requiring compensation.  Suppose the probability is one in 
ten million.  Then a country with a population of fifty million could kill five people at 
random, assessing their deaths at no cost at all.”). 
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There would seem to be two ways to explain the finding that 
the value of k x ∆U increases as the value of 1/r increases.  One 
could either posit that the value of k increases when a higher 
magnitude mortality risk is involved or posit that the value of ∆U 
increases when a higher magnitude mortality risk is involved.  
The latter possibility is plainly absurd.  The welfare loss 
associated with premature death cannot plausibly be thought to 
vary depending on the magnitude of the risk of premature death 
occurring.100  The former possibility, however, contradicts Adler 
and Posner’s assertion that k “is precisely the rate that would 
determine [a person’s] WTP/WTA for marginal nonlongevity 
changes to his welfare . . . .”101  Adler and Posner say nothing to 
suggest the possibility that k can vary.  They certainly make it 
sound as though k is a constant, fixed conversion rate for all 
“marginal nonlongevity changes to welfare.”  However, Adler 
and Posner’s approach suggests the value of k would change 
significantly depending on the magnitude of the mortality risk at 
issue.  As the magnitude of the risk increases, k increases 
significantly.102  The question then becomes: why should the k 
value derived from a person’s willingness to pay to avoid a 1 in 
100 or 1 in 1,000 mortality risk be any less valid than the k value 
derived from a person’s willingness to pay to avoid a 1 in 100,000 
or 1 in 1 million mortality risk?  At the end of the day, there does 
not seem to be any non-arbitrary way to set the value of k, nor do 
Adler and Posner suggest one.  But if that is true, then the 
monetization of the welfare loss associated with premature death 
itself (k x ∆U) is arbitrary as well. 
The other problem with Adler and Posner’s analysis is that, 
even if it is correct as far as it goes, it ignores the ex ante welfare 
setback associated with imposition of a risk of premature death.  
According to Adler and Posner, the VSL represents a reasonably 
accurate monetization of the welfare loss associated with 
premature death.  However, as Adler himself noted when 
summarizing Broome’s critique in the passage quoted above, 
100. See Adler, supra note 83, at 284.
101. See ADLER & POSNER, supra note 3, at 180.
102. For example, assuming a person were willing to pay $90 to avoid a 1 in 100,000
mortality risk, but $20,000 to avoid a 1 in 1,000 mortality risk, the value of k derived from 
an analysis based on a 1 in 1,000 mortality risk would be more than double the value derived 
from an analysis based on a 1 in 100,000 mortality risk. 
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when a premature death is expected to result from the imposition 
of a small mortality risk on a large number of people, two welfare-
related losses are involved.  In addition to the welfare loss 
associated with the premature death itself, there is also the welfare 
loss associated with the mere imposition of the mortality risk on 
the risk-bearers.103  If Adler and Posner are correct that the VSL 
represents a monetization of the ex post welfare loss associated 
with an actual premature death, then how does the ex ante welfare 
loss associated with the risk imposition get accounted for and 
monetized so that it can be incorporated into CBA? 
The standard response to this objection is that the mere 
imposition of a risk of death need does not involve an actual 
welfare loss (unless the risk-bearer is aware of the risk and 
experiences fear or apprehension as a result) and therefore need 
not be incorporated into CBA.104  There are, however, two 
problems with this response.  To begin with, it does not square 
well with statements by Viscusi, Sunstein, and the EPA to the 
effect that the VSL represents the tradeoff between money and 
small risks of death, not the tradeoff between money and death 
itself.105 Such statements suggest—more or less explicitly—that 
103. Adler and Posner seem to implicitly acknowledge this point when they posit that 
“small changes to [a person’s] utility . . . are converted to dollars at rate k” and then use k in 
the equation k x ∆U x 1/r to represent a person’s “WTP to avoid the 1-in-r risk.”  Id.; see 
also sources cited supra notes 77, 81, & 83. 
104. See, e.g., Adler, supra note 83, at 286 (“[R]isk, per se, is not a harm.  Fear and 
other affective states associated with risk can surely constitute welfare setbacks—and should 
be separately measured by the cost-benefit analyst—but the mere fact that a person is at risk 
of death does not diminish his well-being.  Most plausibly, this is true where the person is 
unaware of the risk; it also may be true where he is aware of the risk, but does not fear it.”); 
Stephen R. Perry, Risk, Harm, and Responsibility, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF 
TORT LAW 321, 336 (David G. Owen ed., 1995) (“[I]f the processes that caused or might in 
the future cause physical harm are deterministic, then there is no basis for saying that a person 
who has been put at risk by another of suffering such harm has, just by reason of being put 
at risk, sustained damage distinct in kind from the physical harm.”). 
105. See, e.g., Viscusi, supra note 10, at 101 (“The value of a statistical life (VSL) is
the individual’s money-risk tradeoff for small risks of death.”); SUNSTEIN, supra note 5, at 
51 (“With these [VSL] values, the government is not actually ‘valuing life.’  It is valuing the 
reduction of mortality risks—typically by eliminating low-level risks, for example, risks of 
1 in 100,000.”); Mortality Risk Valuation: What Does It Mean To Place A Value On Life?, 
EPA, https:// www.epa.gov/ environmental-economics/ mortality- risk- valuation # 
whatisvsl [https://perma.cc/97P3-5HNC] (“The EPA does not place a dollar value on 
individual lives.  Rather, when conducting a benefit-cost analysis of new environmental 
policies, the Agency uses estimates of how much people are willing to pay for small 
reductions in their risks of dying from adverse health conditions that may be caused by 
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a mortality risk imposition does, in fact, involve an actual welfare 
loss.  Indeed, a 2010 EPA guidance document directly implies as 
much: 
Some EPA policies are designed to reduce the risk of 
contracting a potentially fatal health effect such as 
cancer.  Reducing these risks of premature death 
provides welfare increases to those individuals affected 
by the policy.  These policies generally provide 
marginal changes in relatively small risks. . . . For 
BCA, analysts generally aggregate these small risks 
over the affected population to derive the number of 
statistical lives saved (or the number of statistical 
deaths avoided) and then use a ‘value of statistical life’ 
(VSL) to express these benefits in monetary terms.106 
The most natural way of reading such statements by the 
EPA, Viscusi, Sunstein, and others is that the mere imposition of 
a mortality risk involves a welfare loss to the risk-bearer and it is 
this welfare loss that drives individuals’ reported willingness to 
pay to be free of small mortality risks. 
But even assuming for the sake of argument that, absent 
awareness or fear, the mere imposition of a mortality risk does 
not involve an actual welfare loss to the risk-bearer, the question 
is whether this means that such a risk imposition lacks moral 
significance.  If I point a partially loaded gun at your head while 
you are asleep or unconscious and play Russian roulette, but no 
bullet is fired, have I violated an interest of yours?  Have I 
wronged you?  If you were later to view a film of the incident, 
would you be justified in feeling moral outrage?  The intuitive 
answer to these questions seems to me clearly to be “Yes,” even 
if the source of the wrong were not an actual welfare setback.107  
If this intuition can be trusted, then it follows that, when a 1 in 
100,000 risk of death imposed on 100,000 people results in one 
environmental pollution.  In the scientific literature, these estimates of willingness to pay for 
small reductions in mortality risks are often referred to as the ‘value of a statistical life.’”). 
106. NAT’L CTR. FOR ENVTL. ECON., EPA, Appendix B: Mortality Risk Valuation
Estimates, in GUIDELINES FOR PREPARING ECONOMIC ANALYSES B-1, B-1 (2014) 
(emphasis added).   
107. See, e.g., Aaron James, The Distinctive Significance of Systemic Risk, 30 RATIO 
JURIS 239, 244 (2017) (“The interest we have in our exposure to risk is an objective interest 
in its own right, which is not to be confused with or reduced to our separate interests in not 
suffering the experience of risk exposure.”).  I borrow the Russian roulette example from 
James’s paper. 
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person’s death, 99,999 people suffered a setback to a welfare-
related interest (even if not an actual welfare loss) and one person 
suffered the welfare loss associated with death itself.  If Adler and 
Posner are correct that the $9 million VSL is intended to capture 
the latter only, the former remains unaccounted for.  Leaving risk 
imposition out of the calculation in this way is hard to understand.  
It is common sense that eliminating a mortality risk benefits every 
person who would have been exposed to it, not just those unlucky 
individuals who would have died were the risk to have 
materialized. 
In sum, the VSL does not persuasively monetize the welfare 
loss associated with premature death itself.  What it does 
persuasively monetize is the welfare loss (or the setback to 
welfare-related interests) associated with the imposition of a 
small risk of premature death on a large number of people.  And 
even if the VSL does accurately capture the welfare loss 
associated with the ex post harm of death, it then fails to capture 
the ex ante interest setback resulting from the imposition of a 
small risk of death on a large number of people.  Either way, the 
norm of maximizing overall well-being fails to persuasively 
justify the use of the VSL in standard cost-benefit analysis of 
mortality risk regulations, whether the type of mortality risk at 
issue is a consumption risk (as in Arsenic (100,00)), a workplace 
risk, or an environmental risk.  The question then becomes 
whether other norms might be able to do the job. 
C. The Norm of Personal Autonomy
The notion of autonomy has played a central role in Western 
moral philosophy, at least since Kant.108  Where the autonomy of 
individual persons—rather than nations or other collective 
entities—is concerned, it is commonplace to refer to “personal” 
autonomy.109  An individual possesses personal autonomy to the 
extent the individual is self-governing; that is, to the extent the 
108. See IMMANUEL KANT, METAPHYSICAL PRINCIPLES OF VIRTUE, in ETHICAL 
PHILOSOPHY 44-54 (James W. Ellington trans., 1983) (1797). 
109. See, e.g., Personal Autonomy, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (2018), http:// plato. 
stanford. edu/ entries/ personal- autonomy [https://perma.cc/Y7MX-8RUV] (distinguishing 
group autonomy from autonomy of an individual person). 
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individual acts and lives in accordance with her own will.110  In 
the words of the moral philosopher John Christman, 
[T]o be autonomous is to be one’s own person, to be directed
by considerations, desires, conditions, and characteristics
that are not simply imposed externally upon one, but are part
of what can somehow be considered one’s authentic self.
Autonomy in this sense seems an irrefutable value,
especially since its opposite—being guided by forces
external to the self and which one cannot authentically
embrace—seems to mark the height of oppression.111
Another contemporary moral philosopher, Shelly Kagan, 
offers the following definition: 
To have autonomy is to have the various aspects of one’s life 
under one’s control.  Typically, if I have autonomy over 
some aspect of my life (whether my career, my hair color, or 
how I spend this Thursday afternoon), then I can deliberate 
concerning how I want that aspect of my life to go, choose 
among the various alternatives open to me, and act so as to 
make my life the way I want it to be in that regard.112 
From the standpoint of morality, respect for a person’s 
autonomy clearly seems to be one of the normative factors that 
can determine the rightness or wrongness of a particular action.  
Kagan puts this point in terms of a moral prohibition on 
interfering with another’s autonomy: 
110. See id. (“Autonomous agents are self-governing agents. . . . In short, every agent
has an authority over herself that is grounded, not in her political or social role, nor in any 
law or custom, but in the simple fact that she alone can initiate her actions.”). 
111. Autonomy in Moral and Political Philosophy, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL.
(2015), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/autonomy-moral [https://perma.cc/SW E9-Z6W2]; 
see also JOHN CHRISTMAN & JOEL ANDERSON, AUTONOMY AND THE CHALLENGES TO 
LIBERALISM 3 (2005). This definition of autonomy differs from that offered by Gerald 
Dworkin in his influential study.  Dworkin understands autonomy as “a second-order 
capacity of persons to reflect critically upon their first-order preferences, desires, wishes, and 
so forth and the capacity to accept or attempt to change these in light of higher-order 
preferences.”  GERALD DWORKIN, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF AUTONOMY 20 (1988).  
The more traditional understanding of autonomy adopted by Christman and Kagan—and the 
one I adopt in this article—seems to correspond roughly to what Dworkin calls “liberty.”  
See id. at 14 (“Suppose we think of liberty as being, roughly, the ability of a person to do 
what she wants, to have (significant) options that are not closed or made less eligible by the 
actions of other agents.”). 
112. KAGAN, supra note 41, at 111.
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One natural suggestion is that there should be a prohibition 
against interfering with the autonomy of another.  If I act in 
such a way as to reduce, or to undermine, the control that 
someone else has over their own life, then I harm them in a 
profound way.  My act fails to reflect the fact that my victim 
has his own conception of how he wants his life to go and 
that—but for my action—he would have been better able to 
live as he has chosen.113 
Alternatively, one can put the idea in terms of rights: an 
individual has the right to determine for herself how her own life 
will go and how she will or will not act in the world.114  Although 
not absolute, this right of autonomy would seem to be entitled to 
substantial respect, particularly where an action or decision 
implicates the interests of the agent only, and not the interests of 
any other person. 
D. Personal Autonomy Justifies Use of a VSL
1. A Stylized Consumption Risk Scenario: Arsenic (1)
Suppose the government is deciding whether to enact an 
arsenic regulation that would affect a single person, A (call this 
Arsenic (1)).  Suppose the regulation would eliminate a 1 in 
100,000 risk of death to A at a cost of $200, which cost would be 
entirely passed on to A in the form of an increase in A’s water 
rates.  Suppose further that, after closely studying consumption- 
and employment-related choices involving mortality risks in the 
general population, the government concludes that very few 
people would be willing to pay more than $90 to avoid a 1 in 
100,000 risk of death.  From the standpoint of autonomy, what is 
the normative significance of that conclusion for the 
government’s decision whether to enact the regulation at issue in 
Arsenic (1)? 
One possible claim is that, if very few people would be 
willing to pay $200 to avoid a 1 in 100,000 risk of death, then 
enacting the arsenic regulation—which effectively forces A to 
make that payment—would show a lack of respect for A’s 
113. Id. at 291.
114. See Autonomy in Moral and Political Philosophy, supra note 111.
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personal autonomy.115  This claim rests on the implicit inference 
that, because few people in the general population would be 
willing to pay $200 to avoid a 1 in 100,000 mortality risk, A 
would not be willing to make that payment.  This is, of course, a 
non sequitur.116  A might be one of the few people who would be 
willing to pay $200 to avoid a 1 in 100,000 mortality risk.  
However, the government’s data arguably shows that, as to A or 
any other individual in the general population, it is very unlikely 
that the individual would be willing to make such a payment.  If, 
for some reason, information about A’s degree of mortality risk 
aversion and risk-related preferences were unavailable, the 
government might reasonably rely on such data to make a 
determination about A. 
Suppose one accepts the claim that, based on the 
government’s data, it is highly unlikely that A would be willing 
to pay $200 to avoid a 1 in 100,000 mortality risk.  It would then 
be reasonable to ask: assuming A would be unwilling to make 
such a payment, what are the implications for whether it is 
morally permissible for the government to enact the regulation in 
Arsenic (1)? 
To enact the regulation in such circumstances would seem to 
be an unjustifiable violation of A’s personal autonomy.  Because 
A is the only person who would be affected by the regulation—
we are assuming that the associated cost and risk fall entirely on 
her—the government could not base a decision to enact the 
regulation on a need to safeguard the interests of any other person.  
Because all of the costs and benefits associated with enacting or 
not enacting the contemplated regulation fall on A and no one 
else, the norm of personal autonomy is very strongly implicated, 
115. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 5, at 93 (“Perhaps regulatory policy should not be 
based on welfare. . . . Even if so, WTP might be defended on the ground of personal 
autonomy.  On this view, people should be sovereign over their own lives.  Government 
should respect people’s choices about how to use limited resources (again so long as those 
choices are informed).  When people decline to devote more than $90 to the elimination of 
a 1/100,000 risk, it is because they would prefer to spend the money in a way that seems to 
them more desirable.  If regulators do not use people’s actual judgments, then they are 
insulting their dignity.”); see also Viscusi, supra note 8, at 322 (“Although many non-
economists continue to attack the entire concept of monetizing risks to life, these implicit 
tradeoffs are reflective of how people themselves value the risks and respect consumer 
sovereignty in much the same way as do prices in other economic markets.” (emphasis 
added)). 
116. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 5, at 92-93.
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whereas norms like fairness and equity—which have to do with 
the distribution of burdens and benefits among multiple persons 
or parties—do not seem to be relevant.  If, after informed 
deliberation, A freely and voluntarily prefers a 1 in 100,000 
mortality risk to a $200 cost, A’s right to be sovereign in matters 
which affect her, and only her, interests would seem to have a 
clear moral implication: to enact the regulation in Arsenic (1) 
would be an unjustifiable violation of A’s personal autonomy. 
It is important to note that, as presented above, the 
autonomy-based case against regulating in Arsenic (1) is not 
founded on a claim that A voluntarily consented to the mortality 
risk associated with drinking water containing arsenic.117  The 
argument is based on an assumption—made on the basis of 
government data on the general population—about A’s general 
preferences and behavior in the area of mortality risks.  The 
argument is not based on any specific decision A made after being 
informed of the arsenic risk and asked to choose between taking 
on the 1 in 100,000 mortality risk or paying the $200 cost.  
Instead, the autonomy-based case against the regulation rests 
implicitly on a claim that, had this choice been given to A, A 
would have chosen to assume the risk rather than pay the cost.  It 
is, in other words, based on A’s hypothetical consent, not her 
actual consent.118 
In Arsenic (1), the autonomy-based case against regulating 
seems relatively strong.  It is not airtight, however.  As noted 
above, the case depends on the assumption that A is not one of 
the very few people in the general population who would be 
willing to pay $200 to avoid a 1 in 100,000 mortality risk.  But, 
what if it turned out that A were a member of that tiny minority?  
What if, given all the relevant information, A would freely and 
deliberately choose to pay $200 rather than be exposed to a 1 in 
100,000 risk of premature death?  If that were true, it would seem 
difficult to defend the choice not to regulate in Arsenic (1) on the 
basis of autonomy.  Choosing not to regulate—and thereby 
imposing the risk rather than the cost on A—would run contrary 
to A’s free and informed preferences.119  Because the regulation 
117. See id.
118. For further discussion of the moral significance of hypothetical (as opposed to 
actual) consent to a risk imposition, see infra Part II.D.2 & text accompanying notes 142-44. 
119. See Autonomy in Moral and Political Philosophy, supra note 111.
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affects A and A alone, this would, arguably, violate A’s right to 
sovereignty over her own life.120 
In such a case, the government might offer an alternative 
justification for choosing not to regulate: welfare maximization.  
The government could claim that A’s preference for paying $200 
rather than accepting a 1 in 100,000 mortality risk, despite being 
informed, voluntary, and free, is irrational because, as a matter of 
fact, paying the cost would leave A worse off than being exposed 
to the risk.  The government might defend that conclusion on the 
basis of its general population data by claiming that the fact that 
the vast majority of people prefer a 1 in 100,000 mortality risk to 
a $200 cost shows that all people would be better off bearing the 
risk than bearing the cost.  On this view, the few people who 
prefer the cost to the risk are guilty of what Cass Sunstein has 
termed “miswanting”: freely and voluntarily preferring 
something contrary to their own best interests.121  If this is so, the 
government might defend a decision not to regulate in Arsenic (1) 
as an instance of justifiable paternalism,122 one similar to the 
government’s requirement that occupants of moving automobiles 
wear seatbelts.  Some people might make a free and informed 
decision not to wear a seatbelt when driving. But, by requiring all 
drivers and passengers to wear a seatbelt, the government 
effectively deems such a decision to be irrational.  It deems the 
preference for not wearing a seatbelt to be an instance of 
miswanting, one that can therefore be justifiably overridden in 
order to maximize the well-being of the miswanter. 
120. Id.
121. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 5, at 118-22 (discussing phenomena of “miswanting”
and informational and behavioral market failures); see also Adler and Posner, supra note 43, 
at 1116-22 (discussing phenomena of uninformed preferences, adaptive preferences, and 
objectively bad preferences). 
122. See KAGAN, supra note 41, at 112 (“Prohibitions against paternalism rule out
interfering with another’s autonomy . . . [by] forcing someone to do what’s best for 
himself.”); DEREK PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS 321 (1984) (“We are paternalists when 
we force someone act in his own interests.  It provides some justification for paternalism, 
when this involves coercion or the infringement of someone’s autonomy, if we are stopping 
this person from acting irrationally.”).   
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2. A More Realistic Scenario: Arsenic (100,000)
The next question is whether the autonomy-based case 
against regulation loses any of its force when we move from 
Arsenic (1) to the more realistic case of Arsenic (100,000), in 
which an arsenic mortality risk of identical magnitude—1 in 
100,000—is imposed on 100,000 consumers.  As above, suppose 
this risk could be eliminated at a total cost of $20 million, which 
would be entirely passed on to the risk-bearing consumers in the 
form of a $200-per-capita cost.  As with Arsenic (1), it should be 
assumed that the government’s regulatory decision is based on 
general population data showing that very few people would be 
willing to pay more than $90 to avoid a 1 in 100,000 mortality 
risk. 
From an autonomy standpoint, enacting the regulation in 
Arsenic (100,000) features 100,000 instances of the autonomy 
violation involved in enacting the regulation in Arsenic (1).  
Arguably, if enacting the regulation in Arsenic (1) is wrong 
because it would unjustifiably violate the autonomy of one 
person, then enacting the regulation in Arsenic (100,000) is 
egregiously wrong because it would unjustifiably violate the 
autonomy of 100,000 people. 
Unlike in Arsenic (1), however, the norm of maximizing 
overall well-being arguably favors a choice to regulate in Arsenic 
(100,000).  Where the risk in question would fall on 100,000 
people, rather than one person, not enacting the regulation would 
be expected to result not just in the imposition of a very small risk 
of death on one person (as in Arsenic (1)), but rather in a single 
premature death, one which could be prevented by distributing a 
$20 million cost among 100,000 people.  For reasons discussed 
in the previous section, it is not at all clear that overall well-being 
would be greater in a world featuring both the imposition of a 1 
in 100,000 risk on 100,000 people and the risk’s materialization 
in one expected premature death than it would be in a world 
featuring the imposition of a $200 cost on each of 100,000 people.  
There may, in fact, be good reason to believe that the welfare-
maximizing course of action would be to impose the $20 million 
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cost, thereby not only sparing 100,000 people from the risk 
imposition but also sparing one person from premature death.123 
A decision to regulate in Arsenic (100,000) might also be 
defended on the basis of fairness.  In Arsenic (100,000), it is clear 
from an ex ante point of view that someone would probably be 
killed were the regulation not enacted.124  It is not as though this 
is a single-person case (like Arsenic (1)), in which it is highly 
unlikely that the risk will materialize in anyone’s death.  In 
Arsenic (100,000), it is probable that at least one person will die.  
Therefore, it might be argued, it is not just a matter of respecting 
the autonomy interests of a group of 100,000 individuals, all of 
whom are identically situated with respect to the risk imposition 
in question.  It is a matter of fairly balancing the interests of the 
100,000 people affected ex ante against those of the one person 
likely to be fatally affected ex post.  Thus, this situation is, 
arguably, not relevantly different from one in which 100,000 
town residents are each asked to pay $200 to subsidize the $20 
million rescue of a miner trapped at the bottom of the town mine 
(call this Trapped Miner).  In both cases, it would arguably be 
unfair to allow the death of one person to occur simply to spare 
each of 100,000 people from having to pay a cost of $200.  In 
both cases, each of the 100,000 cost-bearers can, on the basis of 
the norm of fairness, justifiably be required to invest $200 to save 
a life.125  Thus, even if the welfare maximization case for 
123. Of course, to say that the imposition of a 1 in 100,000 risk of death on 100,000 
people would be expected to result in the death of one person is not to say that there is a 
100% chance of it doing so.  As to each risk-bearer, there is a 99.999% (.99999/1) chance 
that the imposition will not result in death.  The chance that the risk imposition will not result 
in any risk-bearer’s death is therefore .99999100,000 or roughly 36.8%.  Thus, imposing a 1 in 
100,000 risk of death on 100,000 people creates roughly a 63.2% chance of at least one death.  
The chance that exactly one death will occur is roughly 36.8% (.99999 99,999 x (.00001) x 
(100,000)), while the chance that two or more deaths will occur is roughly 26.4%.   
124. See Sophia Reibetanz, Contractualism and Aggregation, 108 ETHICS 296, 303-
304 (1998).  
125. The analogy between Trapped Miner and Arsenic (100,000) assumes that it
makes no difference whether, at the time the decision must be made, the cost-bearers know 
the identity of the person who will die unless action is taken.  Trapped Miner involves saving 
an identified life, whereas Arsenic (100,000) involves saving a statistical life.  The analogy 
between the two situations therefore rests on the implicit claim that this difference ought not 
to be significant for purposes of determining the right course of action in either case.  The 
critique of the analogy in the following paragraph does not take issue with this claim.  
Instead, it focuses on a different dissimilarity between the two situations: that, in Arsenic 
(100,000), the $200-per-capita investment eliminates a mortality risk to each cost-bearer and 
would be expected to save the life of one cost-bearer; by contrast, in Trapped Miner, the 
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regulating in Arsenic (100,000) were deemed uncertain—after all, 
who can really say whether one premature death would decrease 
overall well-being by more than imposing a $200 cost on each of 
100,000 people would?—fairness might provide an alternative 
basis for doing so. 
However, there is a way of meeting this fairness-based 
argument.  To begin with, Trapped Miner is importantly different 
from Arsenic (100,000).  In Trapped Miner, because the 100,000 
cost-bearing individuals are not faced with a choice of whether to 
invest $200 in their own safety, the norm of personal autonomy is 
not implicated in the same way it is in Arsenic (100,000).  One 
could not say to the trapped miner’s family that saving their loved 
one’s life would have required forcing their loved one to make an 
investment in her own safety that, from an ex ante standpoint, she 
could not rationally have wished to make.  But, this is precisely 
the sort of justification that could be offered to the family of the 
deceased water consumer in Arsenic (100,000).126  Such a 
justification would focus on the point that, not only would 
preventing the death have required unjustifiably violating the 
autonomy of 100,000 people, but further that the unlucky victim 
would have been among those whose autonomy would have been 
violated.127  “Knowing what she knew at the time the regulatory 
decision was made,” one might say to the family, “your loved one 
herself could not rationally have wished to pay her share of the 
cost of eliminating the risk that materialized in her death.  
Preventing your loved one’s death would have meant forcing her 
to engage in an irrational transaction: paying $200 for a safety 
benefit worth just $90.  Thus, arguing that fairness required 
enacting the life-saving regulation is tantamount to arguing—
rather absurdly—that it would have been unfair to your loved one 
ex post not to have disrespected her autonomy ex ante.”  Of 
$200-per-capita investment would not have any effect on the mortality risks facing cost-
bearers, nor would it save the life of any cost-bearer.   
126. I borrow this analytical device from Sophia Reibetanz Moreau.  See Reibetanz, 
supra note 124, at 303-04.  
127. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 5, at 115 (“When people decline to devote more than 
$60 to the elimination of a 1/100,000 risk, it is because they would like to spend the money 
in a way that seems to them more desirable.  If regulators do not use people’s actual 
judgments, then they are insulting their autonomy.  Suppose that people in a free society are 
entitled to have a kind of mastery over the conduct of their own lives.  If so, then they should 
be permitted to make such allocations as they choose.”). 
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course, one might still insist that, for welfare maximization 
reasons, the regulation should be enacted, notwithstanding the 
autonomy-based reasons for opening it.  However, given the 
apparent strength of the autonomy-based case against regulation, 
it is at least highly questionable whether this welfare 
maximization argument should prevail. 
In Arsenic (100,000), we saw that the government’s 
regulatory decision was based not on risk-bearers’ actual choice 
to assume a mortality risk rather than the pay the cost of 
eliminating the risk, but rather on studies of risk aversion and 
other risk-related preferences in the general population.128  This 
reflects the way in which decisions are actually made by federal 
agencies when regulating mortality risks: they are based on 
studies of the amount persons in the general population are 
willing to pay to avoid small mortality risks.129  Based on this sort 
of general information, we saw that an inference could be made 
about what the persons actually affected by a particular regulation 
(i.e., the 100,000 risk-bearers in Arsenic (100,000)) would have 
preferred with respect to the mortality risk in question.  More 
specifically, we saw that, based on the general population date, it 
was reasonable to infer that each risk-bearer in those cases would 
very likely have preferred being exposed to the 1 in 100,000 
mortality risk to paying the $200 cost of eliminating that risk.  
Thus, the autonomy-based argument against regulating was 
founded on hypothetical consent to the mortality risk in question, 
not actual consent. 
The question, then, is whether and to what extent the 
autonomy-based case against regulation in Arsenic (100,000) 
suffers by virtue of being based on hypothetical rather than actual 
consent. On one hand, the norm of autonomy seems to be more 
strongly implicated when an informed, free, and voluntary 
decision to assume (or pay to avoid) a particular mortality risk has 
actually been made by each potential risk-bearer130 than it is 
128. See supra Part II.D.2.
129. See, e.g., EPA Analysis, supra note 15, § 5.4.2, at 5-24 (“VSL does not refer to 
the value of an identifiable life, but instead to the value of small reductions in mortality risks 
in a population. . . . VSL estimates are appropriate only for valuing small changes in risk; 
they are not values for saving a particular individual’s life.”); see also supra Part I.A. 
130. The connection between autonomy and actual consent is a strong one.  See
KAGAN, supra note 41, at 292 (“[I]f a person consents to a given form of treatment, then 
typically, at least, being treated in that way will not constitute a violation of autonomy.  For 
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when, on the basis of data about the general population’s risk 
aversion and preferences, a determination is made about what 
each risk-bearer would have decided in that regard.131  On the 
other hand, I believe it would be a mistake to think that the 
absence of an actual decision by risk-bearers about whether to 
assume the risk in question means that the norm of autonomy is 
not implicated at all.132  It would be a mistake, in other words, to 
think that a plausible determination as to what risk-bearers would 
have preferred under the circumstances should have no 
implications for whether the course of action under consideration 
would respect the risk-bearers’ autonomy.133 
To see why, suppose the government were trying to decide 
whether to enact a regulation that would eliminate a 1 in 100,000 
risk of death to 100,000 people at a cost of $20,000 to each risk-
bearer (for a total cost of $2 billion).  In such circumstances, 
should the government be required to actually put the question 
before each risk-bearer—and receive a negative answer from each 
one—in order to be able to defend a decision not to regulate on 
the basis of autonomy?  It seems not.  The fact that it is highly 
plausible to suppose that no risk-bearer would be willing to pay 
$20,000 to avoid a 1 in 100,000 mortality risk supplies ample 
reason to believe that imposing the cost, rather than the risk, 
would violate the autonomy of each risk-bearer, even if it is not 
known for certain whether any of the risk-bearers actually is 
willing to do so.  Enacting a regulation that the risk-bearers would 
almost certainly have objected to is little different from enacting 
a regulation that they actually objected to.  If the latter would 
violate their autonomy, then the former arguably would too. 
example, if I harm you with your permission, or if I fail to act on a promise from which you 
have released me, this doesn’t actually interfere with your autonomy: you are still in control 
of your life, deciding how it is to go.”).  
131. See P.J. Thomas, Measuring Risk-Aversion: The Challenge, 79 MEASUREMENT
285, 285-86 (2016). 
132. See DWORKIN, supra note 111, at 88-89 (noting that, while hypothetical consent
“is not actual consent” and “is simply a judgment about what the agent would have agreed 
to under certain circumstances,” hypothetical consent “appeal[s] to consent or something like 
consent in explaining the obligations and rights [it] create[s]”). 
133. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 5, at 115 (“When people decline to devote more than 
$60 to the elimination of a 1/100,000 risk, it is because they would like to spend the money 
in a way that seems to them more desirable.  If regulators do not use people’s actual 
judgments, then they are insulting their autonomy.”). 
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In Arsenic (100,000), by hypothesis, the general population 
data on which the government’s willingness-to-pay 
determinations were based established that very few people would 
be willing to pay more than $90 to avoid a mortality risk of 1 in 
100,000.  If that were true, it would follow that enacting the 
regulation would mean requiring the vast majority of risk-bearers 
to pay $200 to avoid a mortality risk that, if given a choice, they 
would have instead chosen to assume.  Arguably, this would 
disrespect the personal autonomy of the vast majority of risk-
bearers.  The fact that a decision not to regulate in Arsenic 
(100,000) is based on hypothetical rather than actual consent does 
not seem to undermine, in any significant way, an argument that 
this decision can be defended on the basis of autonomy. 
Of course, autonomy works as a justification for using a VSL 
to guide the regulation of consumption risks only to the extent the 
government’s willingness-to-pay data provides a secure basis for 
determining what the risk-bearers would or would not have 
consented to in a given set of circumstances.  The urgent 
questions therefore become epistemic ones.  In a given instance, 
how sure can the government be of the accuracy of its 
determinations about what risk-bearers would or would not have 
consented to under the circumstances?  How can the government 
make its willingness-to-pay determinations sensitive to the fact 
that risk preferences will inevitably vary across different types of 
mortality risks,134 as well as across different individuals 
depending on, among other factors, their wealth, socioeconomic 
status, age, and cultural preferences?135  Even assuming the 
government were able to achieve a high degree of individuation 
regarding the willingness-to-pay preferences among a given 
group of risk-bearers, what figure should the government rely on 
in regulating the risk at issue: the average willingness-to-pay, the 
median willingness-to-pay, or some other statistical figure?  
Proponents of mortality risk CBA often speak in terms of average 
or median WTP of the risk-bearing population,136 though other 
134. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 5, at 96-101; Viscusi, supra note 10, at 152-69.
135. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 5, at 101-06; Viscusi, supra note 10, at 117-20, 133-
34. 
136. See, e.g., SUNSTEIN, supra note 5, at 95 (“[I]t would be grossly misleading to 
offer the following suggestion: The value of a statistical life is $9 million.  It would be much 
more accurate to say that for risks of 1/10,000, the median WTP in the relevant population 
is $900—or that for risks of 1/100,000, the median WTP is $90.”); Posner & Sunstein, supra 
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like-minded commentators appear to suggest that the relevant 
WTP is uniform.137  If the basis of mortality risk CBA is 
autonomy, rather than welfare, it is difficult to see how the 
average or median WTP of the risk-bearing population could be 
a legitimate basis on which to set regulatory levels, because 
regulatory decisions would presumably contravene the 
preferences of the substantial proportion of risk-bearers with 
above-average or above-median risk aversion preferences. 
These epistemic inquiries, although critically important, lie 
beyond the scope of this article.  The discussion above establishes 
that, assuming the government can say with a reasonable degree 
of certainty how much money the persons exposed to a given 
consumption risk would have been willing to pay to avoid that 
risk, personal autonomy provides a sound normative basis—and 
seemingly the only sound normative basis—for using a VSL to 
guide the regulation of such a risk.  This is a significant 
conclusion, one which challenges both the claim that using a VSL 
in mortality risk regulation has no normative basis in any moral 
context138 and the claim that use of a VSL in the moral context of 
consumption risks can be defended on the basis of maximizing 
overall well-being.139 
III. WORKPLACE RISKS AND EQUITY
Commonly, an industrial activity poses a risk of death to a 
group of persons that benefits meaningfully from the activity, but 
does not bear any significant share of the costs of complying with 
regulations that reduce the risk.140  Workplace risks are perhaps 
note 26, at 551 (“Suppose, for example, that workers must be paid $[9]00, on average, to 
eliminate a risk of 1/10,000.  If so, the value of a statistical life would be said to be $[9] 
million.”); Posner, supra note 36, at 324 (“Suppose that it is discovered by studies of people’s 
behavior that the average person would be willing to incur a maximum cost of $1 to avoid 
the one-in-a-million chance of being killed by some hazard that a proposed project would 
eliminate.”). 
137. See, e.g., Viscusi, supra note 36, at 105 (“[A] group of 10,000 people facing an 
individual risk of death of 1/10,000 will incur one expected fatality in the group.  If each 
person is willing to pay $500 to eliminate the risk, then there is a collective willingness to 
pay $5 million to eliminate the one statistical death.” (emphasis added)). 
138. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 8.
139. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 9.
140. Sunstein calls risk impositions of this type “harder cases,” since such cases tend
to be more difficult to analyze than cases in which the persons exposed to a risk also bear the 
costs of reducing it.  See SUNSTEIN, supra note 5, at 127 (“There is an obvious artificiality 
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the best example of this type of risk imposition.141  Many 
industries employ production processes that pose serious health 
risks to workers in those industries.  For example, many industries 
use toxic chemicals that pose a risk of death or serious illness to 
the workers exposed to the chemicals in the course of performing 
their job duties.142  As with consumption risks, all or substantially 
all of the costs of complying with government regulations 
designed to reduce workplace risks tend to be passed on to 
consumers in the form of price increases or deducted from 
shareholder profits.143  When this occurs, the group of people 
exposed to the risk in question (workers) is not the same group 
responsible for paying the costs of reducing that risk (consumers 
or shareholders).  This is what makes workplace risks 
fundamentally different from consumption risks from a normative 
standpoint.  Although workers obviously benefit from the 
industrial activity that places them at risk (because it provides 
them with gainful employment), the burden of complying with 
risk-reducing regulations tends to fall on others.  These features 
in the assumptions thus far. Most important, people do not always bear the full social costs 
of the regulatory benefits that they receive. . . . When this is so, the analysis is much more 
complicated.”). 
141.  However, environmental risks might also exhibit this structure.  For example, the 
persons living in proximity to a plant that emitted carcinogenic fumes into the air might 
significantly benefit from the risk-generating industry, whether by consuming its products 
or in some other way.  See, e.g., id. at 127-28 (offering air pollution regulation as an example 
of a case in which those exposed to the risk at issue do not bear the costs of regulations that 
reduce the risk). 
142. A prominent example is the use of benzene in the oil refining industry.  Benzene 
poses a cancer risk to workers exposed in the course of their duties.  See Indus. Union Dep’t. 
v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 613 (1980) (discussing OSHA’s regulation of
workplace exposure to benzene).
143. See Identification, Classification, and Regulation of Potential Occupational
Carcinogens, 45 Fed. Reg. 5002, 5237 (Jan. 22, 1980) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1990) 
(“The public, by and large, equally benefitted from and paid the costs for cleaner 
water. . . . However, in the case of occupational safety and health, different groups enjoy the 
economic savings of not regulating and take the risks.  Consumers save through lower prices 
and employers benefit through higher profits from not regulating, while risks are borne by 
workers, often in the lower economic groups.  Therefore, occupational safety and health 
posed an ‘equity’ question.” (emphasis added)) (summarizing testimony of Dr. Nicholas 
Ashford of MIT); see also Occupational Exposure to Hexavalent Chromium, 71 Fed. Reg. 
10100, at 10280-281 (Feb. 28, 2006) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pts. 1910, 1915, 1917, 
1918, & 1926) (“Price elasticity refers to the relationship between the price charged for a 
service and the demand for that service; that is, the more elastic the relationship, the less able 
is an establishment to pass the costs of compliance through to its customers in the form of a 
price increase and the more it will have to absorb the costs of compliance from its profits.”).  
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of the typical workplace risk create a particular moral context, one 
that is relevant to the justifiability of using a VSL to guide 
mortality risk regulation.  In this Part, I argue that, when it comes 
to risks exhibiting this structure, using the basic concept of 
individual willingness-to-pay to guide mortality risk regulation is 
morally defensible on the basis of the norm of equity.144  
However, using a VSL to guide mortality risk CBA is not 
defensible in this context because it relies on a collective, rather 
than individual, willingness-to-pay determination. 
A. Example: Chromium in the Workplace
Hexavalent chromium (Cr(VI)) is a toxic substance used in 
a number of industries.145  Compounds containing chromium are 
used intentionally to perform metal electroplating and to produce 
chemical catalysts and pigments for textile dyes, paints, inks, 
glass, and plastics.146  Chromium compounds are also formed 
incidentally as a byproduct of certain welding processes and as an 
impurity found in portland cement.147  According to OSHA, there 
are over 30 industry sectors in which workers may be exposed to 
chromium.148 
Compounds containing chromium can exist in mist, dust, or 
fume form, and have long been known to pose health risks to 
workers when inhaled or upon contact with skin.149  Most 
significantly, exposure to chromium can cause lung cancer, which 
144. Cf. Identification, Classification, and Regulation of Potential Occupational 
Carcinogens, 45 Fed. Reg. at 5237, 5239 (“[O]ccupational safety and health pose[s] an 
‘equity’ question. . . . [OSHA believes that] as a matter of policy, efficiency criteria alone 
are not appropriate because they ignore equity considerations.  The economic savings from 
less protective regulation accrue to industry in the form of higher profits and consumers in 
the form of lower prices.  But the costs are borne by workers through increased industrial 
illness and death rates.”); Waisman, supra note 19, at 1265-67 (arguing feasibility-based 
regulation of workplace mortality risks is defensible on the basis of the norm of equity).  
145. See Pub. Citizen Health Research Grp. v. U.S. Dep’t. of Labor, 557 F.3d 165,
169 (3d Cir. 2009) (denying petition challenging OSHA’s regulation of hexavalent 
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is often fatal.150  Chromium exposure can also cause nonfatal 
ailments such as asthma, dermatitis, nasal irritation, and 
gastrointestinal ulcers.151 
In 1971, OSHA set a permissible exposure level for 
chromium of 52 micrograms per cubic meter (µg/m3).152 By 2004, 
chromium’s carcinogenic properties had become clear, and 
OSHA consequently proposed reducing the chromium exposure 
standard to 1 µg/m3.153  In 2006, after extensive comments and 
hearings, OSHA issued its final rule, which set a somewhat higher 
chromium PEL of 5 µg/m3.154  This was the exposure level that 
OSHA ultimately found to satisfy the feasibility standard 
applicable under the Occupational Safety and Health Act.155 
As part of its analysis, OSHA calculated the annual costs and 
monetized benefits of setting the chromium PEL at the various 
alternative levels it was considering.156  The benefits included the 
prevention of both fatal and nonfatal cancers.157  To monetize the 
avoidance of fatal cancers, OSHA adopted the EPA’s then-
prevailing $6.8 million VSL; to monetize the avoidance of 
nonfatal cancers, OSHA employed an analysis based on both the 
VSL and a cost-of-illness approach.158  Discounting costs and 
150. Pub. Citizen Health Research Grp., 557 F.3d at 169-70; see also Occupational
Exposure to Hexavalent Chromium, 71 Fed. Reg. 10100, 10224 (Feb. 28, 2006) (to be 
codified at 29 C.F.R. pts. 1910, 1915, 1917, 1918, & 1926). 
151.  Occupational Exposure to Hexavalent Chromium, 71 Fed. Reg. at 10108, 10166,
10174. 
152. Pub. Citizen Health Research Grp., 557 F.3d at 169.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. See id.; see also 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) (2012) (providing that, in promulgating 
regulatory standards for toxic materials or other hazardous substances, OSHA “shall set the 
standard which most adequately assures, to the extent feasible, on the basis of the best 
available evidence, that no employee will suffer material impairment of health or functional 
capacity” (emphasis added)). 
156. See Occupational Exposure to Hexavalent Chromium, 71 Fed. Reg. at 10305,
10307. 
157. See id. at 10305.  Based on various scientific studies OSHA considered, it 
estimated ranges of the annual cancer-prevention benefits of setting the chromium PEL at 
the various alternative levels it was considering.  For annual avoided lung cancer deaths, the 
reported ranges for each PEL were as follows: .25 µg/m3: 66-258; .5 µg/m3: 62-243; 1 µg/m3: 
58-224; 5 µg/m3: 40-145; 10 µg/m3: 27-95; 20 µg/m3: 15-47.  Id. at 10304, tbl.VIII-10.  For
annual avoided non-fatal cancers, the reported ranges for each PEL were as follows: .25
µg/m3: 9-35; .5 µg/m3: 8-33; 1 µg/m3: 8-31; 5 µg/m3: 5-20; 10 µg/m3: 4-13: 20 µg/m3: 2-6.
Id.
158. See id. at 10305, 10307.
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median monetized benefits by 7%,159  OSHA determined that the 
greatest net benefit ($6 million) would be realized at a chromium 
PEL of 10 µg/m3.160  Discounting costs and median monetized 
benefits by 3%, the greatest net benefit ($231 million) would be 
realized at a PEL of 5 µg/m3.161  Although the 5 µg/m3 level may 
not have been cost-justified, OSHA fixed the chromium PEL at 
that level because, in its feasibility analysis, OSHA determined 
the 5 µg/m3 level to be the lowest PEL economically and 
technologically feasible.162  As noted above, OSHA was 
mandated by federal statute to set the chromium PEL at the lowest 
feasible level.163 
OSHA determined that regulatory costs will generally either 
be passed on to consumers in the form of price increases, or 
absorbed by firms in the form of reductions to profits.164  From 
OSHA’s chromium report, it is difficult to determine either the 
proportion of regulatory costs that would be passed through to 
consumers or the amount of any per-unit price increases by which 
such pass-throughs would be accomplished.  OSHA report does 
provide some helpful information, however. OSHA determined 
that firms in over 30 different industry sectors would be affected 
by the new chromium regulation.165  Many of the firms in these 
industry sectors—e.g., those in the welding and construction 
sectors—may primarily serve other businesses, rather than 
individual consumers, so there may be multiple cost pass-
159. OSHA relied on an assumption of a 7% discount rate in its analysis of costs,
adding an alternative 3% discount rate calculation as part of what it called a “sensitivity 
analysis” when calculating net monetized benefits.  See id. at 10263 (“[A]ll costs are 
annualized at a discount rate of 7 percent. (A sensitivity analysis using a discount rate of 3 
percent is presented in the discussion of net benefits.).”). 
160. See id. at 10306, tbl.VIII-11, 10308, tbl.VIII-12.
161. See Occupational Exposure to Hexavalent Chromium, 71 Fed. Reg. at 10306,
tbl.VIII-11, 10308, tbl.VIII-12. 
162.  Elsewhere, I have argued that the 5 µg/m3 chromium PEL on which OSHA settled 
was normatively defensible on the basis of equity.  See Waisman, supra note 19, at 1306-12. 
163. See 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) (2012).
164. See, e.g., Occupational Exposure to Hexavalent Chromium, 71 Fed. Reg. at
10280-81 (“Price elasticity refers to the relationship between the price charged for a service 
and the demand for that service; that is, the more elastic the relationship, the less able is an 
establishment to pass the costs of compliance through to its customers in the form of a price 
increase and the more it will have to absorb the costs of compliance from its profits.”). 
165. See id. at 10272-82, tbl.VIII-7.
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throughs to take into account before a regulatory cost reaches an 
individual “end user.”166 
Thus, OSHA’s regulation of chromium exposure exhibits 
the structure of the typical workplace risk.167  The risky activity 
at issue—industrial use of chromium—provides a benefit to each 
risk-bearing worker (in the form of gainful employment) and to 
each cost-bearing consumer (in the form of a desirable product).  
Moreover, as OSHA noted, the costs of complying with 
chromium regulation would likely be passed on either to 
consumers of the regulated industries in the form of price 
increases or to shareholders of firms in those industries in the 
form of reductions to profits.168  Thus, the workers exposed to 
cancer risks from chromium exposure benefit significantly from 
the industrial activity that gives rise to those risks, but do not bear 
the costs of compliance with regulations that reduce those risks.  
This makes the cancer risk posed by chromium exposure a good 
real-world example of a workplace risk. 
B. The Norm of Equity and (Ex Ante) Contractualism
The term equity is defined in Webster’s Third New 
International Dictionary as “a free and reasonable conformity to 
accepted standards of natural right, law, and justice without 
prejudice, favoritism, or fraud and without rigor entailing undue 
hardship.”169  Although often taken to be synonymous with 
fairness,170 equity, as its etymology suggests, specifically 
connotes the aspect of fairness that has to do with equality.171  
“[T]he essence of Justice or Equity,” observed renowned moral 
philosopher Henry Sidgwick, “is that different individuals are not 
to be treated differently, except on grounds of universal 
166. See sources cited supra note 143.
167. See supra text accompanying notes 152-66.
168.  See Occupational Exposure to Hexavalent Chromium, 71 Fed. Reg. at 10280-82. 
169. Equity, WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (2002). 
Throughout this Article, I use the term in this more popular sense, rather than in the technical 
legal sense that refers to the legal system and body of principles originating in the English 
Court of Chancery. 
170.  See, e.g., Equity, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining equity as
“[f]airness; impartiality; evenhanded dealing”). 
171. The term derives from the Latin words aequitas (“equality”) and aequus 
(“equal”).  See Equity, supra note 169. 
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application.”172  Equity is therefore a somewhat narrower concept 
than fairness, as it is specifically concerned with achieving 
fairness in the distribution of burdens and benefits.173  Equity, as 
I understand the term here, is broadly concerned with equalizing 
the burdens borne by differently-situated individuals as the result 
of some socially desirable act, practice, or policy.174 
Like the norm of fairness, the norm of equity presupposes 
the evaluation of an action or policy from the point of view of 
each affected individual, rather than an impersonal evaluation 
from a “view from nowhere” or “God’s eye” perspective.175  
When determining whether an action or policy is equitable, one 
is implicitly and necessarily asking whether it is equitable to a 
particular affected party or to each and every affected party.176  It 
is impossible to determine whether an action, policy, or rule is 
equitable, in a general sense, without assessing and comparing its 
impact on each affected individual.177  This is to be contrasted 
with norms like overall well-being or efficiency, which do not 
require that the perspective of each affected individual be 
consulted and considered.178  It would not make sense, for 
example, to ask whether an action or policy maximizes overall 
well-being to or from the standpoint of a particular party. 
172. HENRY SIDGWICK, THE METHODS OF ETHICS 496 (1930).
173.  By contrast, one can intelligibly speak of fairness in a non-distributive sense.  For
example, consider the notions of “fair play,” see, e.g., International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 
326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (observing that an assertion of personal jurisdiction must not offend 
“traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice” (citation omitted)), and “unfair 
surprise,” see, e.g., 8 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW 
OF CONTRACTS § 18:7 (4th ed. 2010) (discussing notion of “unfair surprise” in the context 
of the unconscionability doctrine in contract law). 
174. See SIDGWICK, supra note 172, at 496-97.
175. See, e.g., John Broome, Fairness, 91 PROC. ARISTOTELIAN SOC’Y 87, 87-96
(1991) (“Fairness is concerned only with how well each person’s claim is satisfied compared 
with how well other people’s are satisfied.  It is concerned with relative satisfaction, not 
absolute satisfaction.” (emphasis omitted)). 
176. This is reflected in the famous definition of justice offered by the Roman jurist
Ulpian: “Justice is the constant and perpetual will to allot to every man his due.”  A.B. Neil, 
Justice and Natural Law, 22 TENN. L. REV. 1025, 1025 (1951) (translating DIG. 1.1.10 
(Ulpian, Regularum 1) (“Iustitia est constans et perpetua voluntas ius suum cuique 
tribuendi.”)). 
177. See Frick, supra note 42, at 221.
178. See id. (“[E]quity is an ‘individualistic’ moral notion. Being equitable is a 
property that attaches to actions, not in virtue of their overall or aggregate effects, but in 
virtue of how they treat each person individually.”). 
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However, what exactly equity requires in a particular case 
may not be deducible from these rather abstract observations.  For 
purposes of my analysis in this article, I therefore adopt a 
particular interpretation of the notion of equity.  Specifically, I 
will hold an action, practice, policy, or rule to be equitable if and 
only if it would be permitted by contractualism.179  Introduced by 
the philosopher T.M. Scanlon in 1982,180 contractualism is a 
relatively new theory of normative ethics founded on the social 
contract tradition in political philosophy (embodied in the work 
of Locke,181 Rousseau,182 and Rawls183) and on the Kantian 
tradition in moral philosophy.184 
Contractualism is not a general theory of morality, but rather 
a theory of interpersonal morality or, to use Scanlon’s famous 
phrase, of “what we owe to each other.”185  In this area of 
morality, Scanlon intended contractualism to offer an account of 
what it means for an action to be wrong.186  In this article, I follow 
an alternative interpretation of contractualism, one originally 
offered by Derek Parfit and since endorsed by other 
philosophers.187  The alternative interpretation holds that 
contractualism specifies a wrong-making property of an action, 
rather than explaining what it means for an action to be wrong.188  
On this view, an action might be wrong for non-contractualist 
reasons, or it might be wrong from a contractualist point of view 
but right all things considered.189  This interpretation of 
179. See id. at 220-21 (arguing that the notion of equity best captures the “wrong-
making property” that contractualism specifies). 
180. See generally T.M. SCANLON, WHAT WE OWE TO EACH OTHER (1998)
(especially Chapter 5, pp. 189-247) [hereinafter SCANLON, WHAT WE OWE]; T.M. Scanlon, 
Contractualism and Utilitarianism, in UTILITARIANISM AND BEYOND 103, 103-14 (Amartya 
Sen & Bernard Williams eds., 1982) [hereinafter Scanlon, Contractualism]. 
181. See generally JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT (Richard H.
Cox ed., Harlan Davidson 1982) (1690). 
182. See generally JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, On the Social Contract, in BASIC
POLITICAL WRITINGS 153-252 (Donald A. Cress ed. & trans., 2011). 
183. See generally RAWLS, supra note 40.
184. See generally KANT, supra note 108, at 44-54.
185.  Thus, contractualism does not directly address questions of political morality, the
moral strictures applicable to the actions and policies of coercive institutions, nor does it 
address our moral obligations to animals or future persons.   
186. See Scanlon, Contractualism, supra note 180, at 110.
187. See 1 DEREK PARFIT, ON WHAT MATTERS 368-70 (Samuel Scheffler ed. 2011); 
Frick, supra note 42, at 220. 
188. Frick, supra note 42, at 220.
189. See id. at 222.
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contractualism obviously squares well with normative pluralism.  
For the pluralist, contractualism specifies the requirements of 
equity, which is one of the normative factors that can determine 
the rightness or wrongness of an action. 
According to contractualism, “an act is wrong if its 
performance under the circumstances would be disallowed by any 
set of principles for the general regulation of behavior that no one 
could reasonably reject as a basis for informed, unforced general 
agreement.”190  What exactly does that mean?  An example will 
be a useful place to start in answering this question. 
Suppose the government is deciding between two different 
policies with which to accomplish a particular goal, Policy One 
and Policy Two. (Call this Policy Choice.) Both policies will 
affect a group of 1 million people, Group A, and a separate group 
of 100 people, Group B.  At the time of the government’s 
decision, all members of both groups enjoy roughly equal levels 
of well-being and all members of both groups enjoy a decent, 
intermediate standard of living.  Policy One would leave members 
of Group A much better off by increasing their standard of living 
from decent to high, but would leave members of Group B much 
worse off by lowering their standard of living from decent to low.  
Policy Two would leave members of Group A slightly better off 
by making a very small improvement in their standard of living, 
but would leave members of Group B slightly worse off by 
making a very small reduction in their standard of living.  From a 
normative point of view, which policy should the government 
adopt? 
The norm of welfare maximization provides a normative 
basis for choosing Policy One.  The welfare-maximizing policy is 
the policy under which the aggregate (overall) well-being of all 
affected persons is greater than it would be under any alternative 
policy.191  In the above example, following this norm would mean 
190. SCANLON, WHAT WE OWE, supra note 180, at 153.
191. The norm of welfare maximization, as I understand it here, is essentially 
equivalent to classical utilitarianism, except that it holds that the goodness of the outcome of 
an action or policy is to be evaluated on the basis of how it affects the well-being of 
individuals, rather than on how much pleasure or pain it produces.  See Consequentialism, 
STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Oct. 22, 2015), https:// plato.stanf ord.edu/ entries/ 
consequentialism/ [https://perma.cc/68Z7-9F6E] (“When a welfarist theory of value is 
combined with the other elements of classic utilitarianism, the resulting theory can be called 
welfarist consequentialism.”).   
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calculating the net aggregate gain (or loss) in welfare associated 
with each policy, and choosing the policy that delivers the greater 
net gain (or smaller net loss) to aggregate welfare.  It seems clear 
that both policies would increase aggregate welfare on net.  This 
follows from the fact that, while each policy would result in a 
reduction in the well-being of 100 people (Group B), each policy 
would also deliver an equally-sized increase to the well-being of 
1 million people (Group A).  For this reason, both policies would, 
from a welfare maximization point of view, plausibly result in a 
net improvement over the status quo.192  The question is which 
policy delivers the bigger improvement, i.e., the greater increase 
to overall well-being.193  On that question, it seems clear that 
Policy One wins out.  While Policy One would make each Group 
A member much better off, Policy Two would make each Group 
A member only slightly better off.  Were Group A the only group 
of people affected, it is clear that Policy One would result in a 
significantly greater increase in aggregate well-being than Policy 
Two would.  Does this change when the policies’ respective 
effects on Group B are taken into consideration?  Almost certainly 
not.  Although Policy One would leave members of Group B 
worse off than Policy Two would, Group B is only a tiny fraction 
(1/10,000) of the size of Group A.  The policies’ respective effects 
on 100-person Group B therefore play a negligible role in 
determining how they would each affect the aggregate well-being 
of all 1,000,100 affected persons.  For these reasons, Policy One 
would deliver a greater net increase to aggregate well-being than 
Policy Two would (or so I am assuming).  The norm of welfare 
maximization therefore favors Policy One. 
Contractualism provides a normative basis for choosing 
Policy Two.  Contractualists believe that the normatively 
appropriate policy is the one that could be justified not to the 
entire group of affected persons considered as a whole, but to 
each affected person in light of how the policy, and the available 
alternatives, would affect him or her.194  To use contractualist 
192. To put this point in the language of welfare economics: although neither policy 
would represent a Pareto improvement over the status quo, both policies would result in a 
Kaldor-Hicks improvement. 
193. See Consequentialism, supra note 191.
194. See Contractualism, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Aug. 2, 2012), https://
plato.stanford.edu/entries/contractualism/ [https://perma.cc/SH9C-YUBJ]. 
2018 MORAL CONTEXT 265 
language, the morally permissible policy is the one permitted by 
a principle that no person could reasonably reject.195  Policy One 
is not justifiable to members of Group B because there is an 
alternative policy—Policy Two—under which no person is left as 
bad off as members of Group B would be left under Policy One.  
A contractualist would maintain that members of Group B could, 
on that basis, reasonably reject a principle licensing Policy One, 
making Policy One morally impermissible.  Members of Group 
A might wish to reject a principle permitting Policy Two in favor 
of Policy One, but they could not reasonably do so, as they would 
implicitly be asking each member of Group B to put up with being 
left substantially worse off (rather than only slightly worse off) so 
that each member of Group A can avoid being left only slightly 
better off (rather than substantially better off). 
The contractualist criterion of moral rightness involves three 
core ideas: (i) the idea that interpersonal morality presupposes the 
requirement of  justifiability to each affected person considered 
as an individual, rather than the requirement of justifiability to all 
affected persons considered in the aggregate;196 (ii) the idea that 
the moral status of a particular act (its rightness or wrongness) is 
a function of the moral validity of the general principle licensing 
the act;197 and (iii) tying together the first two tenets, the idea that 
a principle is justifiable to each person if and only if it would 
command the free assent of all persons, i.e., if and only if no 
person could reasonably reject it as a principle for the general 
regulation of behavior.198  Thus, under contractualism, an act is 
morally right if and only if no one could reasonably reject a 
general principle permitting the act. 
When, according to contractualism, can a principle be 
reasonably rejected?  The concept underlying the notion of 
195. Id.
196. SCANLON, WHAT WE OWE, supra note 180, at 390 n.8 (“What is basic to 
contractualism as I understand it is the idea of justifiability to each person (on grounds that 
he or she could not reasonably reject).”). 
197. Id. at 197 (“To justify an action to others is to offer reasons supporting it and to 
claim that they are sufficient to defeat any objections that others may have.  To do this, 
however, is also to defend a principle, namely one claiming that such reasons are sufficient 
grounds for so acting under the prevailing conditions.”). 
198. Id. at 197, 390 n.8.
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reasonable rejectability is the minimax criterion.199  Among a set 
of candidate principles, the non-rejectable principle P is the one 
of which the following is true: the strongest complaint any person 
could make against P, were P generally accepted, is weaker than 
the strongest complaint that could be made against every other 
alternative principle.200  As Scanlon puts it, “[S]omeone can 
reasonably reject a principle if there is some alternative to which 
no other person has a complaint that is as strong.”201  The 
principle no one could reasonably reject is the principle that, 
among a set of candidate principles, minimizes the strength of the 
complaint that could be lodged by the maximally burdened 
person.202  Supposing I am the person that would be most 
burdened by general acceptance of a particular principle, I still 
cannot reasonably reject that principle if every alternative 
principle would, if generally accepted, impose a greater burden 
on someone else. 
Contractualism thus contemplates a rejectability inquiry the 
goal of which is to identify the principle or policy satisfying the 
minimax criterion.  This is a fundamentally comparative inquiry 
that takes into account not just the extent to which general 
acceptance of each candidate principle burdens each affected 
person in an absolute sense, but also the differential each person 
experiences in the burdens they would bear under the respective 
principles.203  That is, supposing A is the most burdened party 
under Principle P-1 and B the most burdened party under 
Principle P-2, we ask not only if A’s burden under Principle P-1 
is weightier than B’s burden under Principle P-2, but also if A’s 
gain in moving from P-1 to P-2 is more significant than B’s gain 
in moving from P-2 to P-1.  The question to be asked, in other 
199. I follow Sophia Reibetanz Moreau in using the minimax criterion to explain the 
notion of reasonable rejectability.  See Reibetanz, supra note 124, at 300 (describing a 
“Minimax Complaint Model” of reasonable rejectability) (emphasis omitted).   
200. See id.; see also Scanlon, Contracualism, supra note 180, at 111-12.
201. SCANLON, WHAT WE OWE, supra note 180, at 229; see also Scanlon,
Contractualism, supra note 180, at 111 (“[I]t would be unreasonable . . . to reject a principle 
because it imposed a burden on you when every alternative principle would impose much 
greater burdens on others.”). 
202. Applying the minimax rule to complaints or burdens is roughly (though not
perfectly—see infra note 204 and accompanying text) equivalent to applying the more 
familiar “maximin” rule to outcomes for individual well-being.   
203. See Scanlon, Contractualism, supra note 180, at 113; Reibetanz, supra note 124, 
at 299. 
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words, is whether it would be unreasonable for A to refuse to 
accept the loss she would experience in moving from P-2 to P-1 
in order that B can avoid the loss she would experience in moving 
from P-1 to P-2.204 
A critically important feature of contractualism—one that 
makes it particularly appropriate as an interpretation of equity—
is what has been termed its individualist restriction, i.e., “the 
insistence that the justifiability of a moral principle depends only 
on various individuals’ reasons for objecting to that principle and 
alternatives to it.”205  In other words, according to the 
individualist restriction, the strength of a complaint lodged 
against a particular principle can never be a function of the sum 
of different individuals’ gain (or loss) in well-being under that 
principle as compared with some alternative principle.206  
Contractualism, in other words, does not allow for the 
interpersonal aggregation of complaints.207  Contractualism 
instead contemplates a series of “pairwise comparisons” in which 
one representative individual’s burden under a particular 
principle is compared to one other representative individual’s 
burden under an alternative principle.208  Thus, in Policy Choice, 
the fact that there are many more people in Group A than in Group 
B plays no role in determining which policy is justifiable to each 
person.  That determination is made entirely on the basis of a 
pairwise comparison between representative members of each 
group.209 
204. See Scanlon, Contractualism, supra note 180, at 123.  For example, suppose that
under P-1, A’s well-being is 102 and B’s 103 and that under P-2, A’s well-being is 150 and 
B’s 101.  The mere fact that the loser under P-1 (A) is slightly better off than the loser under 
P-2 (B) does not necessarily mean that P-1 is the non-rejectable principle satisfying the
minimax criterion.  This is because A might plausibly be taken to have a stronger complaint
with P-1 being chosen over P-2 than B would have with P-2 being chosen over P-1. Why?
Because it would arguably be unreasonable for B to refuse to accept a 2-unit (roughly 2%)
reduction in well-being in order that A can avoid a 48-unit (roughly 32%) reduction in well-
being.  Thus, B could not reasonably reject P-2.
205. See SCANLON, WHAT WE OWE, supra note 180, at 229.
206. See Reibetanz, supra note 124, at 300.
207. Id.
208. See id.
209. In cases involving the imposition of a risk of harm, as opposed to the imposition 
of harm itself, contractualism requires a further specification.  Are the possible policies or 
courses of action to be evaluated on the basis of the risk of harm they pose to each person 
they might impact (so-called “ex ante contractualism”) or on the basis of the actual harm 
they cause to the person or persons they do impact (so-called “ex post contractualism”).  For 
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C. Equity Justifies Use of Willingness-to-Pay, But Not
a VSL
1. A Stylized Workplace Risk Scenario: Chromium (2)
Suppose the government is deciding whether to enact a 
chromium regulation that will affect two and only two people, W 
and C.  W, the only worker employed in the industry in question, 
is exposed to chromium in the course of her work.  C is the 
industry’s only consumer.  Suppose that, prior to regulation, 
chromium exposure poses a 1 in 50,000 mortality risk to W. The 
risk can be reduced in half, to 1 in 100,000, at a cost of $40 to the 
industry, which cost will be entirely passed on to C in the form of 
a price increase.  The risk can be entirely eliminated at a cost of 
$240 to the industry, which cost will also be entirely passed on to 
C. (Call this Chromium (2).) Suppose, as above, that the
government has determined that, although very few people would
be willing to pay more than $90 to avoid a 1 in 100,000 mortality
risk, the vast majority of people would be willing to pay $90 to
avoid a mortality risk of that magnitude.  From the standpoint of
morality, which of the following three actions is appropriate: not
to regulate at all, to regulate so that the risk is reduced to 1 in
100,000 (moderate regulation), or to regulate so that the risk is
eliminated (aggressive regulation)?  The following chart shows
the risk and cost burdens associated with each regulatory option.
reasons I have described elsewhere, I find ex ante contractualism to be the more plausible 
and defensible form of contractualism in cases involving imposition of a risk of harm.  See 
Waisman, supra note 19, at 1291-95.  A number of commentators have reached a similar 
conclusion.  See, e.g., Frick, supra note 42, at 180, 219; Aaron James, Contractualism’s (Not 
So) Slippery Slope, 18 LEGAL THEORY 263, 274, 292, & n.7 (2012); Rahul Kumar, Risking 
and Wronging, 43 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 27, 48 (2015).   















1 in 100,000 risk 





(WTP = $0) 
$240 
Notice first that the norm of personal autonomy is not 
implicated here in the same way it is in the case of consumption 
risks.211  Recall that in Arsenic (1), the risk-bearer’s autonomy-
based objection to the risk-reducing regulation rested on the fact 
that the regulation’s costs and benefits would fall entirely on her 
and her alone.212  For that reason, the risk-bearer’s rational 
preference for assuming the risk, rather than paying the cost of 
avoiding it, could not be overridden without disrespecting her 
right to be sovereign in matters bearing exclusively on her own 
interests.213  Absent a determination that the risk-bearer’s 
preference was an irrational one, we saw that there did not seem 
to be any normative basis for forcing A to invest more in her own 
safety than she would wish to.214 
By contrast, if the government decides to regulate in 
Chromium (2), C may be forced to pay a cost she does not wish 
to pay, but this would not involve forcing her to invest in her own 
safety.  In Chromium (2), by hypothesis, the costs of the 
regulation fall on C, but the associated risk-reduction benefit 
accrues to W.  For this reason, were C to object to the regulation 
on autonomy grounds, the objection could not be based on C’s 
210. The assumption here is that, if W is willing to pay $90 to avoid a 1 in 100,000 
mortality risk, she would be willing to pay at least twice as much to avoid a 1 in 50,000 
mortality risk.  See supra note 36 (noting that willingness-to-pay increases nonlinearly with 
the magnitude of the mortality risk avoided). 
211. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 5, at 130 (noting that, in cases where risk-bearers do 
not bear the costs of risk-reducing regulations, “it is much harder to argue that the use of 
cost-benefit analysis promotes autonomy”). 
212. See supra Part II.D.1.
213. Supra notes 114-19 and accompanying text.
214. See supra Part II.D.1.
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right to be sovereign in matters affecting her own and only her 
own interests.  The regulatory decision here affects C’s interests, 
but it also clearly affects W’s. 
Of course, this does not mean that the norm of autonomy is 
not implicated at all.  C might argue that forcing her to make any 
sort of investment in W’s safety would violate her autonomy, 
because C might rationally prefer not to invest anything in 
reducing the risk chromium exposure poses to W.  However, 
unlike the autonomy-based case against regulation in Arsenic (1), 
the autonomy-based case against regulation in Chromium (2) 
faces a powerful counterargument based on the norm of equity, a 
norm which attends to the distribution of burdens and benefits 
among distinct persons.215 
This counterargument would begin by observing that C and 
W both benefit in a direct and meaningful way from the existence 
of the industry that, through its use of chromium, poses a risk of 
premature death to W.  C benefits from consuming the industry’s 
product.  W benefits from gainful employment in the industry’s 
production process.  Because C and W both derive significant 
benefits from the industry’s existence, it is reasonable to ask them 
both to bear a share of the burdens necessary to provide those 
benefits.  C’s burden takes the form of the monetary cost she must 
pay to purchase and consume the industry’s product.  W’s burden 
takes the form of the risk she must bear to participate in the 
industry’s production process.  Notice that these burdens are 
inversely proportional: because the industry will typically pass on 
the costs of regulatory compliance to consumers, lessening the 
mortality risk W faces will mean increasing the cost C must pay 
for the industry’s product.  Because W and C have a mutual 
burden-sharing responsibility, the key question then becomes 
how to equitably balance the burdens that C and W respectively 
bear.  Because C and W both benefit significantly from the 
activity, equity arguably requires that, as far as possible, their 
respective burdens be equalized.216 
215. See Waisman, supra note 19, at 1265-66.
216. If the net benefit W realizes from the activity is substantially greater than the net
benefit C realizes (or vice versa), equity would arguably require that a larger share of the 
activity’s mortality risk burden be borne by the party that realizes the larger net benefit.  The 
analysis in this Part proceeds on the assumption that the net benefits realized by workers and 
consumers are roughly equal.  Where this is not the case and there is a significant disparity 
in net benefit between worker and consumer, equity may require that a multiplier be used to 
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With these observations as background, it is not difficult to 
see why W would have a powerful equity-based argument for 
choosing moderate regulation over no regulation.  Assume that W 
and C are identical with respect to their preexisting levels of 
wealth and their willingness to pay for reductions in mortality 
risk.217  Assume further that W and C would both be willing to 
pay $90 for a 1 in 100,000 reduction in mortality risk.  Finally, 
assume W and C would both suffer the identical reduction in well-
being as the result of bearing a given monetary cost or a given 
mortality risk.  A decision not to regulate at all, rather than to 
regulate moderately, would mean denying W a safety benefit 
worth $90 (to both W and C) for the sake of sparing C from a $40 
cost.  From the standpoint of contractualism, the question is 
whether C could reasonably reject a principle requiring her to pay 
$40 to spare W from a risk imposition that both C and W would, 
by hypothesis, be willing to pay $90 to avoid.  Put in terms of 
welfare rather than dollars, could C reasonably reject a principle 
requiring her to bear the welfare loss associated with paying a $40 
cost in order to spare W from experiencing the presumably larger 
welfare loss associated with a risk imposition that is equivalent to 
paying a $90 cost?218 
It seems that she could not.  As between no regulation and 
moderate regulation, moderate regulation is the course of action 
that satisfies contractualism’s minimax requirement.  As the chart 
adjust the burden of risk regulation accordingly.  For example, if, on average, each worker’s 
net benefit from the activity were twice as large as each consumer’s, it would arguably be 
inequitable to require a consumer to bear any regulatory cost c unless the associated 
reduction in each worker’s mortality risk were one for which the worker would be willing to 
pay 2c or more.  In Chromium (2), the moderate regulation, which imposes a $40 cost on the 
consumer, would satisfy this test because the safety benefit it provides, a 1 in 100,000 
reduction in the worker’s mortality risk, is one for which the worker would, by hypothesis, 
be willing to pay $90, which is more than twice the amount of its $40 cost. 
217.  These are, of course, unrealistic assumptions.  I make them here just for purposes
of stating the equity-based arguments in the simplest and clearest way possible.  I later 
consider how differences in preexisting wealth levels and risk aversion would complicate the 
argument.  See infra note 233 and accompanying text. 
218. When asking this question, it is critical to bear in mind that C is not simply being 
asked to pay $40 to reduce a mortality risk to someone else.  Rather, C is being asked to pay 
$40 to mitigate the mortality risk burden that an activity from which C benefits places on 
someone else. Although C is not herself imposing a mortality risk on W, the risk is imposed 
as a necessary incident of an industrial activity that provides a significant benefit to C.  For 
that reason, as we saw above, it is reasonable to ask C to bear a share of the cost of reducing 
the risk to W.   
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above illustrates, under either no regulation or moderate 
regulation, W is the most burdened party.  If no regulation is 
enacted, W bears a 1 in 50,000 mortality risk (which she would 
be willing to pay at least $180 to avoid) and C experiences no 
increase in the cost of the product.  If the government opts for 
moderate regulation, W bears a 1 in 100,000 mortality risk (which 
she would be willing to pay $90 to avoid), and C experiences a 
$40 increase in the product’s cost.  W is therefore the most 
burdened party under either regulatory scenario, but her burden is 
obviously lighter under moderate regulation.  From the standpoint 
of the absolute level of the affected parties’ burdens, the minimax 
criterion therefore favors moderate regulation.  The minimax 
criterion also favors moderate regulation from a comparative 
standpoint.  Compared to no regulation, moderate regulation 
delivers to W a risk-reduction benefit worth at least $90, while 
imposing on C a monetary cost of just $40.  C could not 
reasonably refuse to put up with the $40 cost of moderate 
regulation in order that W can enjoy the $90 safety benefit that 
she would miss out on were the government to decide not to 
regulate at all.219  For these reasons, contractualism would hold 
that W could reasonably reject a principle allowing for no 
regulation of chromium exposure at all, whereas C could not 
reasonably reject a principle allowing moderate regulation.  
Taking contractualism as an interpretation of equity, this means 
that it would be inequitable for the government to choose no 
regulation over moderate regulation.  In other words, a decision 
not to regulate chromium exposure at all, rather than to regulate 
moderately, would mean asking W to bear more than her fair 
share of the burden of the industrial activity that benefits both C 
and W in a meaningful way. 
If equity favors moderate regulation over no regulation in 
Chromium (2), it also favors moderate regulation over aggressive 
regulation.  Regulating aggressively would reduce W’s mortality 
risk by 1 in 50,000 at a cost of $240 to C.  Compared with 
moderate regulation, aggressive regulation would reduce W’s 
mortality risk by an additional 1 in 100,000 at an incremental cost 
219. Cf.  Scanlon, Contractualism, supra note 180, at 123 (“The question to be asked 
is, is it unreasonable for someone to refuse to put up with the Losers’ situation under [one 
principle] in order that someone else should be able to enjoy the benefits which he would 
have to give up under [an alternative principle]?”). 
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of $200 to C.  Could C reasonably reject a principle requiring her 
to pay an additional $200 to provide W with an additional risk-
reduction benefit for which W herself would be willing to pay no 
more than $90?  In other words, could C reasonably refuse to 
accept the welfare loss associated with paying a $200 cost so that 
W can avoid the smaller welfare loss associated with a risk 
imposition that is equivalent to paying a $90 cost? 
It seems that she could.  As between moderate regulation and 
aggressive regulation, moderate regulation is the course of action 
that satisfies the minimax criterion.  Although W is the most 
burdened party under moderate regulation, C is the most burdened 
party under aggressive regulation.  W’s burden under moderate 
regulation is a 1 in 100,000 mortality risk, while C’s burden under 
aggressive regulation is a cost of $240.  Since, by hypothesis, C 
and W would be willing to pay no more than $90 to avoid a 1 in 
100,000 mortality risk, C’s monetary burden under aggressive 
regulation is arguably weightier than W’s mortality risk burden 
under moderate regulation.  Thus, from an absolute standpoint, 
moderate regulation would seem to be the course of action that 
minimizes the extent of the burden borne by the maximally 
burdened party.  The same is true from a comparative standpoint.  
Compared to moderate regulation, aggressive regulation lowers 
W’s mortality risk by 1 in 100,000 while increasing C’s monetary 
burden by $200.  In other words, aggressive regulation would 
mean imposing an incremental burden of $200 on C for the sake 
of providing an incremental risk reduction benefit of $90 to W.  
To do so would be inequitable.  C could reasonably refuse to 
accept a $200 cost for the sake of delivering a risk reduction 
benefit worth just $90 to W.  To ask C to accept this burden would 
be to ask her to invest more in W’s safety than W herself would 
have been willing to invest in her own safety.  If W herself would 
not have been willing to pay more than $90 to avoid a 1in 100,000 
mortality risk, it seems unreasonable to ask C to pay $200—over 
twice as much—to provide W with a risk reduction of that 
magnitude. 
Thus, adopting ex ante contractualism as an interpretation of 
equity, the most equitable course of action in Chromium (2) is for 
the government to regulate moderately, reducing W’s risk of 
death from chromium exposure from 1 in 50,000 to 1 in 100,000 
at a cost of $40 to C.  Neither W nor C could reasonably reject a 
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principle allowing for moderate regulation because both of the 
other regulatory alternatives—no regulation and aggressive 
regulation—involve imposing a greater burden on some party (W 
and C, respectively) than moderate regulation imposes on the 
party it burdens most heavily (W).  This is just what it means to 
say that, among all three regulatory alternatives, moderate 
regulation is the alternative that satisfies the minimax criterion. 
Recall that C might object to regulation in Chromium (2) on 
autonomy grounds.220  A decision to regulate moderately or 
aggressively would arguably violate C’s autonomy by requiring 
her to pay a cost she may not wish to pay.  It is now clear that this 
objection could be met forcefully on the basis of equity.  If C 
wishes to avail herself of the benefits of the chromium-using 
industry, she can reasonably be expected to bear an equitable 
share of the associated burden.  She is not being forced to 
purchase the good or service offered by the chromium-using 
industry.  Once she chooses to do so, she can reasonably be asked 
to bear her fair share of the burden the industry imposes on 
society.  Contractualism’s minimax criterion represents a 
plausible specification of what each party’s equitable share of the 
industry’s mortality risk burden would be.  Any violation of C’s 
autonomy resulting from adherence to the minimax criterion in 
setting the appropriate level of regulation would therefore seem 
to be justifiable on the basis of equity.  Thus, from the standpoint 
of normative pluralism, moderate regulation would seem to be the 
right course of action, all things considered. 
What general point or principle does this analysis of 
Chromium (2) establish?  The most fundamental point is that the 
norm of equity requires that individuals’ willingness-to-pay to 
avoid small mortality risks—the current basis of the VSL—serve 
as a guide for the regulation of workplace risks, just as the norm 
of personal autonomy requires that willingness-to-pay serve as a 
guide for the regulation of consumption risks.221  This general 
point can be formulated as a principle that I have elsewhere 
dubbed the individual risk principle: when it comes to workplace 
risks, equity requires that each cost-bearing consumer make all 
and only those investments in risk-reduction that each risk-
220. See supra notes 211-15 and accompanying text.
221. See Waisman, supra note 23, at 676-79.
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bearing worker would have been willing to make on her own 
behalf.222  As noted above, this principle rests on the premise that, 
because worker and consumer both benefit meaningfully from the 
industrial activity that gives rise to the risk, it is fair to ask both to 
bear a fair share of the activity’s mortality risk burden.223  
According to the individual risk principle, the way to accomplish 
an equitable distribution of this burden is to require each 
consumer to invest in reducing each worker’s mortality risk up to 
the point at which the worker herself would cease investing were 
she to bear each consumer’s share of the regulatory costs.224 
The individual risk principle must be qualified in three 
important ways, however.  First, as formulated above, the 
individual risk principle assumes that (1) the worker and 
consumer both would suffer the identical reduction in welfare as 
the result of the imposition of a given monetary cost or a given 
mortality risk (2) the worker and consumer have the identical 
willingness to pay to avoid mortality risks of varying magnitudes 
(e.g., they would both be willing to pay no more than $90 to avoid 
a mortality risk of 1 in 100,000).225  In the real world, these 
assumptions are unlikely to hold true.  Levels of preexisting 
wealth and income may vary significantly among those 
individuals likely to be affected by a given workplace risk 
regulation.226  Such differences are likely to affect the amount 
individuals are willing to pay to avoid a given mortality risk.  This 
follows from the general point that willingness-to-pay is a 
function of ability-to-pay.227  Moreover, disparities in pre-
existing levels of wealth or income may impact the extent of the 
welfare loss individuals experience as the result of the imposition 
of a given monetary cost.  A $200 cost will almost certainly have 
222. See id. (describing the individual risk principle).
223. Id. at 677.
224.  See id. (noting that individual risk principle represents a “single-owner” approach 
to risk regulation); cf.  Kenneth W. Simons, Deontology, Negligence, Tort, and Crime, 76 
B.U. L. REV. 273, 282 (1996) (describing a “‘single-owner’ conception” of cost-benefit 
analysis “which asks what the actor . . . would do if he owned all the resources in question 
and would therefore internalize all the costs and benefits of the decision”). 
225. See supra notes 221-24 and accompanying text; see also Waisman, supra note 
23, at 676. 
226. See Waisman, supra note 23, at 679.
227. See Mark S. Thompson, Willingness to Pay and Accept Risks to Cure Chronic
Disease, 76 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 392, 392 (1986). 
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a greater effect on the well-being of a very poor person than on 
that of a very rich person. 
For example, suppose W in Chromium (2) is quite poor, 
while C is quite wealthy.  Even assuming W and C have identical 
degrees of aversion to risks of premature death, W would 
plausibly be willing to pay significantly less to avoid a mortality 
risk of 1 in 100,000 than C would.  Suppose that, while C would 
be willing to pay $90 to avoid a risk of that magnitude, W would 
only be willing to pay $30.  Should this give C a sound equity-
based objection to moderate regulation, which would require her 
to invest $10 more in W’s safety that W herself would have been 
willing to invest in her own safety, thereby violating the 
individual risk principle?  Plausibly not.  It is very possible that, 
while the imposition of a 1 in 100,000 mortality risk would reduce 
both W and C’s welfare by the same amount, C would be willing 
to pay significantly more to avoid a risk of that magnitude due 
solely to her greater ability-to-pay to avoid mortality risks 
generally.  In other words, it is quite possible that, if W had C’s 
greater ability-to-pay, W would be willing to pay $90, rather than 
just $30, to avoid the mortality risk to which she is subject.  If that 
were true, it would be inequitable to W to allow C to escape the 
cost of moderate regulation due solely to W’s lesser ability-to-
pay.  Because the setback to W’s welfare due to the 1 in 100,000 
mortality risk would be greater than the setback to C’s welfare 
due to the $40 cost of eliminating that risk, the equitable course 
of action is moderate regulation. 
What this shows is that, in applying considerations of equity 
to mortality risk regulation, the weight of the burdens that 
differently situated individuals are determined to bear should 
really be a function of the individuals’ welfare or welfare-related 
interests.  Willingness-to-pay is just a proxy for welfare.  As Cass 
Sunstein has noted, “Because welfare is the master concept, and 
because monetized numbers are mere proxies, it would seem clear 
that the proxies would have to yield in favor of the master 
concept.”228  The individual risk principle might, then, be 
reformulated as follows in terms of welfare rather than 
willingness-to-pay: in the case of workplace risks, equity requires 
that each cost-bearing consumer invest in risk-reducing 
228. SUNSTEIN, supra note 5, at 129.
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regulation up to the point at which further investment would 
reduce the well-being of each consumer by more than it would 
increase the well-being of each risk-bearing worker.  
Equivalently, equity requires that each cost-bearing consumer 
make all, and only those, risk-reducing investments in worker 
safety that a worker would have been willing to make in her own 
safety, were the worker in the economic situation of the cost-
bearer.229 
The second qualification of the individual risk principle is 
that it must be defeasible in circumstances where it would 
prescribe a level of regulatory investment so great as to threaten 
to bankrupt the regulated industry, assuming the industry’s 
existence is normatively desirable.230  For example, suppose the 
$40 price increase associated with enacting the moderate 
regulation in Chromium (2) were enough to dissuade C from 
purchasing the industry’s good or service altogether.  This 
reduction in consumer demand could make the industry 
unprofitable and thereby drive it out of business.  If the total social 
benefit the industry delivers exceeds the total cost it imposes on 
society,231 bankrupting the industry might be a normatively 
undesirable result.  In such circumstances, capping regulatory 
investment below the level dictated by the individual risk 
principle—and thereby preserving the industry—could therefore 
be defended on the basis of the norms of welfare maximization, 
equity, or both. 
The final qualification relates to normative pluralism.  The 
individual risk principle is meant to represent a specification of 
what the norm of equity (interpreted as ex ante contractualism) 
requires in circumstances of the typical workplace risk, i.e., 
circumstances in which risk-bearers do not bear the costs of risk-
reducing regulations, but both risk-bearers and cost-bearers 
benefit meaningfully from the industrial activity that gives rise to 
229. See Waisman, supra note 23, at 677.
230. See id. at 681 (noting that regulatory costs should be capped “short of the level
required by the individual risk principle if this is necessary to preserve the underlying 
socially beneficial activity”); Waisman, supra note 19, at 1316-31 (same). 
231. See Waisman, supra note 19, at 1317-20 (describing the notion of all-things-
considered beneficialness, i.e., whether the industry in question is socially beneficial taking 
into account considerations of overall well-being, equity, and other relevant normative 
factors). 
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the risk.232  Equity is just one of the several norms that may be 
applicable in such circumstances, and normative pluralism makes 
room for the possibility that, in some cases, the equitable course 
of action may not be the morally right course of action all things 
considered.233  Thus, there may be circumstances in which the 
individual risk principle would dictate a course of action that turns 
out, on a complete normative analysis, to be wrong.  For example, 
suppose a 1 in 1,000 mortality risk to 1,000 workers can be 
eliminated by enacting a regulation costing $5 billion, the cost of 
which would be spread equally among 1 million consumers for a 
per-capita cost of $5,000.  The individual risk principle would 
require enacting the regulation, since, taking $9 million as a VSL, 
each worker would be willing to spend up to $9,000 to avoid the 
mortality risk to which they are subject, a figure substantially in 
excess of the $5,000 each consumer would have to pay were the 
regulation enacted.  However, in such circumstances, a very 
powerful argument against regulation could be made based on the 
norm of welfare maximization.  Imposing a $5 billion cost on 1 
million people by requiring each person to pay $5,000—which 
represents a significant expense for most people—would 
arguably lower overall well-being by significantly more than the 
combination of a single expected death and the imposition of a 
1in 1,000 mortality risk on 1,000 people would.  For this reason, 
welfare maximization considerations might plausibly trump 
equitable considerations in this instance, making it morally 
impermissible to enact the regulation.  This example is offered to 
underscore that the individual risk principle merely specifies the 
requirements of equity as part of a broader, normatively 
pluralistic theoretical framework.  The individual risk principle is 
not here claimed to be a regulatory principle that ought to be 
adhered to in every instance. 
2. A More Realistic Scenario: Chromium (200,000)
The next question is whether the equity-based case for 
moderate regulation in Chromium (2) loses any of its force when 
we move to a more realistic workplace risk scenario in which 
chromium poses a 1 in 50,000 mortality risk to 100,000 workers 
232. See Waisman, supra note 23, at 677.
233. See Waisman, supra note 19, at 1303.
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in a given industry, with the costs of regulation spread among 
100,000 industry consumers in the form of a $40-per-capita price 
increase (for the moderate regulation) and a $240-per-capita price 
increase (for the aggressive regulation).  (Call this Chromium 
(200,000).)  The chart below illustrates the individual and 
aggregate burdens associated with each regulatory option.  Notice 
that, because of the much larger number of risk-bearers involved, 
a choice to regulate in Chromium (200,000) carries the expected 
benefit of saving actual lives (one life in the case of moderate 
regulation, two in the case of aggressive regulation). 
Chromium (200,000) 
In Chromium (2), we saw that equity, interpreted as ex ante 
contractualism, decisively favored moderate regulation over no 
regulation.234  In Chromium (200,000), the equity case for 
moderate regulation is arguably even stronger, because a decision 
not to regulate in Chromium (200,000) would mean treating not 
just one but 100,000 workers inequitably.235 Moreover, in 
234. See Part III.C.1.
235. Cf. supra Part II.D.2 (making similar point about the autonomy-based case 
against regulation in Arsenic (100,000), which would involve 100,000 instances of the 
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addition to equity, welfare maximization arguably provides an 
independent normative basis for moderate regulation in 
Chromium (200,000).236  Choosing not to regulate would 
arguably deliver a greater setback to overall well-being than 
moderate regulation would.237  That is because the imposition of 
a $40 cost on each of 100,000 people would plausibly decrease 
overall well-being by less than the combination of one (expected) 
death and the imposition of an additional 1 in 100,000 mortality 
risk on 100,000 people would.  Thus, in Chromium (200,000), 
both equity and welfare maximization arguably favor moderate 
regulation over no regulation. 
The more interesting question is whether the case for 
aggressive regulation is stronger in Chromium (200,000) than in 
Chromium (2).  After all, regulating aggressively instead of 
moderately in Chromium (200,000) would mean saving one 
additional life.238  For this reason, welfare maximization might 
well favor aggressive over moderate regulation.  As we saw in 
connection with Arsenic (100,000), the imposition of a $200 cost 
on each of 100,000 people would arguably decrease overall well-
being by less than the combination of one (expected) death and 
the imposition of an additional 1 in 100,000 mortality risk on 
100,000 people would.239  If this is so, the case for choosing to 
regulate moderately rather than aggressively in Chromium 
(200,000) would have to rest entirely on equity, just as the case 
against regulation in Arsenic (100,000) rested entirely on personal 
autonomy.  Is the equity-based case for moderate regulation in 
Chromium (200,000) strong enough to overcome the arguable 
welfare maximization case in favor of life-saving aggressive 
regulation? 
In Arsenic (100,000), the case against regulation rested on 
the fact that saving the life of the unlucky consumer killed by 
arsenic would have necessitated violating that consumer’s 
autonomy ex ante.240  Because a decision not to regulate was in 
the ex ante interest of each of the 100,000 cost-paying consumers, 
a choice to regulate would have meant forcing 100,000 people to 
236. See supra tbl. Chromium (200,000).
237. See supra tbl. Chromium (200,000).
238. See supra tbl. Chromium (200,000).
239. See supra Part II.D.2.
240. See supra Part II.D.2.
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make an investment in their own safety that none of them would 
rationally have been willing to make.241  To the family of the 
unlucky consumer killed as the result of a decision not to regulate, 
that decision could be justified by pointing out that saving their 
loved one’s life would have required violating their loved one’s 
autonomy ex ante.242 
What makes aggressive regulation in Chromium (200,000) 
different is that the risk at issue is a workplace risk, not a 
consumption risk.  The costs of regulation are borne by 
consumers who are not exposed to the risk at issue, rather than by 
the risk-exposed workers who benefit from risk-reducing 
regulations.243  Thus, unlike the decision not to regulate in Arsenic 
(100,000), the decision to regulate moderately rather than 
aggressively in Chromium (200,000) cannot be justified on 
grounds of personal autonomy.  To the family of the unlucky 
worker killed when the mortality risk tolerated under moderate 
regulation materializes, one could not justify moderate regulation 
by pointing out that saving their loved one’s life would have 
meant forcing her to invest more in her own safety than she would 
rationally have wished to.  Moreover, unlike the choice not to 
regulate in Arsenic (100,000), a choice to regulate moderately in 
Chromium (200,000) does not work to the ex ante advantage of 
the person unlucky enough to lose their life as the result of that 
choice.244  Whereas opting not to regulate in Arsenic (100,000) 
spares each risk-bearing consumer from a $200 cost, opting for 
moderate rather than aggressive regulation in Chromium 
(200,000) provides no such monetary benefit to the risk-bearing 
workers.245 
In arguing that the government should have chosen to 
regulate aggressively, the unlucky worker’s family might 
therefore draw an analogy between Chromium (200,000) and the 
case of the Trapped Miner, discussed in Part II.  Arguably, if it 
would be unreasonable for the 100,000 town residents to refuse 
to pay $200 each to save the trapped miner’s life, then it would 
be similarly unreasonable for the 100,000 consumers in 
241. See supra Part II.D.2.
242. See supra Part II.D.2.
243. See supra Part III.C.2.
244. See supra Part III.C.2.
245. See supra Part III.C.2.
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Chromium (200,000) to refuse to each accept a $200 price 
increase to save the life of a worker.  Both scenarios involve a 
group of 100,000 people being asked to pay $200 each to save the 
life of a person who is not among the 100,000 would-be cost-
bearers (which is what makes both scenarios relevantly different 
from Arsenic (100,000)).  In both cases, it would arguably be 
inequitable to allow the death of one person to occur simply to 
spare each of 100,000 people from having to pay a cost of $200.  
Thus, the family might argue that the equitable course of action 
in Chromium (200,000) is aggressive regulation. 
This analogy between Trapped Miner and Chromium 
(200,000) rests on an implicit equivalence between identified and 
statistical lives.  The implicit claim is that there is no morally 
relevant difference between an action that will avoid a death 
otherwise certain to befall an identifiable person, and an action 
that will avoid a death otherwise statistically expected to befall an 
ex ante unidentifiable person.246  Is this claim defensible?  Does 
it make any difference, from a moral point of view, that each of 
the 100,000 cost-bearers in Trapped Miner is being asked to pay 
$200 each to avoid certain death for a person who is, at the time 
of the request, identifiable, whereas each of the 100,000 cost-
bearers in Chromium (200,000) is being asked to pay $200 each 
to avoid the expected death of a person who is unidentifiable at 
that time? 
One possible reason it might make a difference is that a death 
that is statistically expected to occur is not certain to occur.  As 
we saw above, when a 1 in 100,000 mortality risk is imposed on 
100,000 people, there is a substantial chance—roughly 36.8%—
that no death will occur.247  It might plausibly be argued that the 
moral obligation to avoid a certain death is greater than the moral 
obligation to avoid a death that has only a 63.2% chance of 
occurring.  However, this distinction is rather unsatisfying 
because many mortality risks are practically certain to result in 
the death of at least one person.  For example, when a 1 in 10,000 
risk of death is imposed on 100,000 people, 10 deaths are 
statistically expected, but the chance of at least one death 
occurring is extremely high: 99.99996% (1 - .9999100,000).  If 
246. On the difference between identified and statistical lives, see sources cited supra
note 42.  See also Frick, supra note 42, at 212 n.41. 
247. See supra notes 94-95.
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Chromium (200,000) were modified so that aggressive regulation 
would involve the elimination of a 1 in 10,000 mortality risk to 
100,000 workers, it begins to look very similar to Trapped Miner 
with respect to the certainty that the regulatory action will avoid 
at least one death.  Many mortality risks that are the subject of 
government regulation are similar in this respect—they are 
statistically expected to result in multiple deaths and practically 
certain to result in at least one death.248 
Suppose then, for the sake of argument, we assume that the 
aggressive regulation in Chromium (200,000) were certain to 
result in the saving of a life that would otherwise have been lost 
due to the chromium exposure tolerated under moderate 
regulation.  With this assumption in place, does it remain a 
morally relevant difference that the identity of the person whose 
life is to be saved in Trapped Miner is known at the time of the 
decision, whereas the identity of the person whose life is to be 
saved in Chromium (200,000) is not? 
From one standpoint, it seems irrelevant whether this 
particular piece of information—the identity of the person whose 
life will be saved by the action under consideration—is known at 
the time of the decision.  If we know for certain that the action 
under consideration will save someone’s life, what does it matter 
whether we know that person’s name, age, gender, ethnicity, 
religion, or other identifying characteristics?249 
However, there is another difference between Trapped 
Miner and Chromium (200,000) which does seem relevant.  The 
difference relates to the fact that, at the time the payment decision 
is to be made in Trapper Miner, there is at least one way of 
identifying the individual whose life will be lost absent action 
being taken: one can say, “It is the person trapped at the bottom 
of this mine.”  One could pick out the person in this way even if 
248. See Lisa A. Robinson, How US Government Agencies Value Mortality Risk
Reductions, 1 REV. ENVTL. ECON. & POL’Y 283, 283-85 (2007) (explaining how government 
agencies calculate risks and create regulations).  These risks are based on deaths statistically 
expected but, as demonstrated above, the likelihood that at least one death will occur is 
extremely high, 99.99996%. 
249. See Reibetanz, supra note 124, at 304 (“[W]henever we know that someone will
be harmed or benefited in a certain way, we should assign him a complaint based upon the 
full magnitude of that harm or benefit.  It is irrelevant, for moral purposes, whether we can 
identify the bearer of this complaint in advance.”); see also Frick, supra note 42, at 184 
(discussing argument that “the identity of the eventual victims is irrelevant information”).   
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one knew none of his or her identifying characteristics (other than 
being a live human being).  By contrast, at the time the regulatory 
decision is to be made in Chromium (200,000), there is absolutely 
no way of identifying or picking out the unlucky worker whose 
life will be lost if the government opts for moderate rather than 
aggressive regulation.  At that time, all it is possible to say is that 
the unlucky worker, whoever she may turn out to be, is presently 
among a group of 100,000 workers, each of whom faces a 1 in 
100,000 risk of premature death if chromium is regulated 
moderately. 
This difference matters from the standpoint of equity.  When 
one decides whether equity requires me to assume a burden in 
order to provide a benefit to you, one relevant question may be 
whether you would have been willing to assume that burden in 
order to provide the identical benefit to yourself.250  Call this the 
single-person test, as it involves imagining that the burden and 
benefit in question would both be experienced by a single person.  
The question is, had you been faced with the choice whether to 
assume a particular burden in order to provide yourself with a 
corresponding benefit, would you have been willing to assume 
that burden?  If so, then equity may require that I assume that 
burden for your benefit.  Contractualism’s minimax criterion, 
which is embodied in the individual risk principle, represents a 
more-or-less straightforward application of this single person 
inquiry.251 
Of course, the answer to the single-person test need not be 
dispositive of the question of whether equity requires me to 
assume a burden for your benefit.  In many circumstances, it 
seems that I could equitably reject bearing a burden that you 
would have been willing to assume for your own benefit.  
Certainly, your willingness to pay a large sum of your own money 
for the benefit of owning a new car does not mean I would be 
acting inequitably by refusing to pay the same sum of my money 
to buy the car for you.  And one can imagine circumstances in 
which equity would require me to assume a greater burden for 
your benefit than you yourself would have been willing to 
250. See Waisman, supra note 19, at 1284-85 (demonstrating equity requires an 
examination of the benefits and burdens to different individuals). 
251. See supra notes 199-203 and accompanying text (illustrating minimax criterion 
as one that requires a principle be accepted if other persons would accept it). 
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assume.  If I negligently run you over with my car and cause you 
serious injuries, treating you equitably may require that I provide 
you with more expensive medical care than you would have been 
willing to provide for yourself, even assuming you and I have 
identical levels of pre-existing wealth. 
But there are circumstances in which the single-person test 
does seem to provide a very good gauge of what equity requires.  
As noted above, when two people (or two groups of people) both 
derive meaningful and roughly equal benefit from an activity that 
imposes a significant burden on either or both of them, equity 
arguably requires that the burdens be, as far as possible, equally 
distributed between them.252  As discussed, the typical workplace 
risk is a good example of such circumstances.  In such 
circumstances, the single-person test can be useful in determining 
what an equitable distribution of the burden would look like.253 
The single-person test raises an epistemic issue, however.  
What information should be assumed to be available to the 
hypothetical person when she makes the decision whether to 
assume the burden in question for her own benefit?  One plausible 
answer is that the person should be assumed to know all and only 
the information that was knowable at the time the decision had to 
be made.  This is, after all, the epistemic constraint on decisions 
made in real life.254  The single-person test could then be 
reformulated in the following way: how would the person have 
acted on their own behalf at the time of the decision, knowing all 
and only what was knowable at that time?  In other words, 
knowing everything relevant and knowable at the time of the 
decision, would you have been willing to assume the burden in 
question for your own benefit? 
Formulating the single-person test in this way allows us to 
understand why, for purposes of equity, Trapped Miner is 
importantly different from Chromium (200,000).  In Trapped 
Miner, at the time the payment decision is to be made, there is 
252. See supra note 216 and preceding text.
253. See supra notes 167-68 and accompanying text (providing an example of typical 
workplace risk); see also supra notes 250-51 and accompanying text (showing single person 
test requires a balancing of the burdens to determine what is equitable). 
254. See generally Hugh Courtney et al., Deciding How to Decide, HARV. BUS. REV., 
Nov. 2013,  https://hbr.org/2013/11/deciding-how-to-decide [https://perma.cc/ J4KR-L6V6] 
(examining process of decision making and how persons are limited by information known 
at the time). 
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information available to all persons—including the potential 
victim—about who it is that will die should the town residents 
choose not to pay the $200-per-capita cost of the rescue: the 
person presently trapped at the bottom of the mine.  Thus, were 
the town residents to apply the single-person test at the time their 
payment decision was to be made, the emphatic answer would be 
affirmative: knowing all and only what was knowable at that time, 
the would-be beneficiary of the payment decision (the trapped 
miner) would undoubtedly have been willing to assume the 
burden of paying $200 in order to receive the benefit of avoiding 
certain premature death.  Were the town residents to choose not 
to assume that burden, they would do so in the knowledge that, at 
the very time they made that choice, there was a person who, 
based on all and only the information available at that time, would 
have been willing to assume that burden on her own behalf.  For 
that reason, equity would arguably require that each town resident 
make a $200 payment to save the miner’s life.255 
By contrast, at the time of the regulatory decision at issue in 
Chromium (200,000), no would-be beneficiary of a decision to 
regulate aggressively rather than moderately would, knowing all 
and only what was knowable at that time, have been willing to 
assume a $200 burden in order to receive the corresponding 
benefit of eliminating a 1 in 100,000 mortality risk.  This is 
precisely what Arsenic (100,000) established: if the most that any 
of 100,000 risk-bearers would be willing to pay to avoid a 1 in 
100,000 mortality risk is $90, then each risk-bearer would 
presumably choose to assume a risk of that magnitude rather than 
pay a cost of $200.256  Assuming the same were true of the 
100,000 workers in Chromium (200,000), then requiring each of 
100,000 cost-bearing consumers to pay $200 to eliminate a 1 in 
100,000 risk of death to those workers would mean requiring each 
consumer to make an investment in the workers’ safety that, 
knowing all and only what was knowable at the time the 
investment decision had to be made, no worker would have been 
willing to make in her own safety.  When I complain that you 
255.  This assumes that Trapped Miner is similar to the typical workplace risk scenario 
in that both the cost-bearers and the person in danger benefit meaningfully from the activity 
that gave rise to the risk.  In Trapped Miner, the risky activity is the operation of the town 
mine, which could be presumed to provide jobs or other benefits to town residents.   
256. See discussion supra Part II.D.2.
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treated me inequitably by failing to assume a burden for the sake 
of providing me with a benefit, it seems morally relevant whether 
you would have been willing to assume the burden on your own 
behalf.  If, knowing all and only what was knowable at the time 
the decision had to be made, you would not have been willing to 
assume the burden on your own behalf, this would seem to be at 
least prima facie grounds for believing that I would not be treating 
you inequitably by refusing to assume the burden on your behalf. 
Thus, to the family of the unlucky worker killed when the 
chromium risk tolerated by moderate regulation materializes, one 
could justify the risk imposition by saying, “Based on what was 
known at the time, your loved one herself would not have been 
willing to invest in her own safety what each cost-bearer would 
have had to invest in order to prevent her death.  Therefore, you 
cannot reasonably expect each cost-bearer to have made that 
investment on your loved one’s behalf.”  And this is precisely 
what could not be said to the family of the unlucky miner in 
Trapped Miner.  Thus, although equity requires saving the 
trapped miner, it arguably requires moderate, rather than 
aggressive, regulation in Chromium (200,000). 
Another way of putting this point is as follows.  Equity 
weighs against aggressive regulation in Chromium (200,000) 
because the position each worker is put in by virtue of being 
exposed to a moderately regulated mortality risk is precisely the 
position the worker would have put herself in had all the burdens 
and benefits associated with the relevant decisions—whether to 
be exposed to the risk at all and how much to spend to reduce the 
risk—fallen on her.257  The worker would have chosen to be 
exposed to the mortality risk associated with chromium because 
this was the necessary cost of receiving the compensating benefit 
of gainful employment.258  Further, for the reasons discussed 
above in connection with Chromium (2), were both the burdens 
and benefits of risk-regulation to accrue to the worker, she would 
257.  See discussion supra Part III.D.2 (showing aggressive regulation is not favorable 
because the cost of the regulation is not justified by the risk). 
258. Obviously, the worker would prefer employment with no mortality risk, but the 
assumption here is that the worker’s decision to accept employment involving chromium 
exposure is a rational one, both because the benefit the worker receives from such 
employment exceeds the loss she experiences by virtue of the associated mortality risk and 
because the net benefit she realizes from such employment exceeds the net benefit she would 
realize from any other available employment. 
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have chosen moderate regulation, rather than no regulation or 
aggressive regulation.259  Thus, for a worker to expect consumers 
to bear the additional $20 million cost of aggressive regulation is, 
simply by virtue of the fact that the costs of risk-reducing 
regulation happen to fall on someone else, to expect to be placed 
in a better position than that in which the worker would have 
placed herself.  To do so would be to unfairly exploit a morally 
arbitrary feature of workplace risks: that those subject to the risk 
happen not to bear the costs of regulations that reduce it. 
Thus, opting for aggressive rather than moderate regulation 
in Chromium (200,000) would be inequitable to each of the 
100,000 consumers for precisely the same reasons that it would 
be inequitable to C in Chromium (2).  The fact that the expected 
cost of opting for moderate over aggressive regulation is greater 
in Chromium (200,000)—one death, rather than a 1 in 100,000 
risk of one death–may strengthen the welfare maximization case 
for aggressive regulation, but it does not seem to weaken the 
equity-based case against such regulation.260  This suggests that 
application of the individual risk principle—which embodies both 
the single person question and contractualism’s minimax 
requirement—achieves equity not only in the stylized two-person 
case of Chromium (2), but also in the more realistic sort of 
workplace risk scenario presented in Chromium (200,000).261  
Where a workplace risk falls on a large number of risk-bearers 
and thereby stands to result in one or more statistical deaths, 
equity requires that each cost-bearer be made to invest in risk-
reduction up to the point at which further investment would 
reduce each cost-bearer’s well-being by more than it would 
increase the expected well-being of each risk-bearer.262  To allow 
regulatory investment to stop short of that point would be 
inequitable to the risk-bearer.  To expect regulatory investment 
beyond that point would be inequitable to the cost-bearer. 
The above analysis establishes that, when it comes to 
workplace risks, equity provides the normative basis for using 
259. See supra note 257 and accompanying text.
260. See supra notes 193 & 257 and accompanying text.
261.  Of course, the same three caveats to the individual risk principle discussed above 
in connection with Chromium (2) apply here as well.  See supra text immediately following 
note 224.  
262. See Waisman, supra note 19, at 1266.
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willingness-to-pay as a guide for risk regulation.  Of course, one 
might still think, in a case like Chromium (200,000), the norm of 
welfare maximization trumps the norm of equity, requiring 
regulatory investment beyond the level dictated by the individual 
risk principle.  Even if this were so, the fundamental point made 
above would still stand: to the extent willingness-to-pay is used 
as a guide for the regulation of workplace mortality risks, the 
basis for doing so is the norm of equity, interpreted as ex ante 
contractualism. 
If one uses willingness-to-pay data as a basis for workplace 
risk regulation, the data must be employed in the way the 
individual risk principle contemplates: to inform a comparison 
between the amount each risk-bearer would be willing to pay for 
a given reduction in their mortality risk and the amount each cost-
bearer would actually have to pay to accomplish that reduction.263  
This comparison relies directly on the individual willingness-to-
pay data underlying the VSL (e.g., an average person would be 
willing to pay $90 to avoid a 1 in 100,000 mortality risk), rather 
than on the collective willingness-to-pay calculation the VSL 
itself reflects (e.g., $9 million is the amount that 100,000 people 
would collectively be willing to pay to avoid a 1 in 100,000 
mortality risk).264  This suggests that, when it comes to workplace 
risks, CBA must be modified in an important way.  The next 
section explains how. 
3. Another Realistic Scenario: Chromium (1.1 million)
Like the decision to regulate in Arsenic (100,000), the 
decision to regulate aggressively rather than moderately in 
Chromium (200,000) would not be cost-justified based on a VSL 
of $9 million.  Both decisions would involve imposing a $20 
million regulatory cost for the sake of realizing a benefit worth 
only $9 million (saving one statistical life).  When a regulation is 
determined not to be cost-justified by the lights of CBA 
employing a VSL that is calculated based on willingness-to-pay, 
what is the normative significance of that determination?  The 
answer is: it depends on the moral context. 
263. See supra notes 221-23 and accompanying text.
264. See supra Part I.A (describing how the VSL is calculated).
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Where those exposed to a mortality risk bear all or 
substantially all of the costs of regulation (as is true in the case of 
the typical consumption risk), a determination that a regulation is 
not cost-justified provides good grounds for believing that 
enacting the regulation would mean violating the personal 
autonomy of each risk-bearer.265  To say a regulation is not cost-
justified is to say the total cost exceeds the total amount risk-
bearers would collectively be willing to pay for the risk reduction 
the regulation accomplishes.266  If that is true, and if regulatory 
costs are equally distributed among the same people who are 
exposed to the risk, enacting a regulation that is not cost-justified 
(such as the regulation in Arsenic (100,000)) is tantamount to 
forcing each risk-bearer to invest more in their own safety than 
they would rationally wish to, thereby violating each risk-bearer’s 
autonomy.267  This was the fundamental point established in Part 
II. 
However, where those exposed to the risk do not bear the 
costs of regulation (as is true in the case of the typical workplace 
risk), whether or not the regulation is cost-justified seems to have 
no independent normative significance.  That is, where workplace 
risks are concerned, there does not seem to be a normative basis 
for basing regulatory decisions on a comparison between the total 
cost of a proposed regulation and the total amount risk-bearers 
would collectively be willing to pay for the risk reduction the 
regulation accomplishes.  In the case of a workplace risk, a 
comparison of this kind is a poor indicator of whether a particular 
regulation would promote autonomy, equity, overall well-being, 
or any other norm. 
To illustrate, consider a workplace risk scenario that is 
identical to Chromium (200,000), except that, instead of being 
distributed among 100,000 consumers, regulatory costs are 
distributed among 1 million consumers.  (Call this Chromium (1.1 
million)).  This reflects a situation that often occurs in the real 
world, where the number of people on which a workplace risk 
falls is just a small fraction of the number of the people among 
265. See supra notes 114-19 and accompanying text.
266. See supra text immediately following note 12 (describing cost-justified and 
providing an example). 
267. See supra Part II.D.
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whom the costs of risk-reducing regulation are spread.268  The 
chart below illustrates the individual and aggregate burdens 
associated with each regulatory option.  Notice that each 
consumer’s burden is 10% the size of the corresponding burden 
in Chromium (200,000). 
Chromium (1.1 million) 
Choosing aggressive over moderate regulation is not cost-
justified here for the same reasons it was not cost-justified in 
Chromium (200,000): it would mean imposing a $20 million 
incremental cost in order to obtain a $9 million incremental 
benefit (avoiding one additional premature death).  However, 
from the standpoint of equity, there is a significant difference 
between Chromium (1.1 million) and Chromium (200,000).  
Where regulatory costs are distributed among 1 million rather 
than 100,000 consumers, a decision to regulate aggressively 
rather than moderately would mean imposing an additional cost 
of $20 on each consumer rather than an additional cost of $200.  
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Because the resulting reduction in each worker’s risk of 
premature death (from 1 in 100,000 to zero) is one for which a 
worker would be willing to pay $90, the individual risk principle 
would require aggressive regulation in Chromium (1.1 million).  
From the standpoint of equity, each consumer can reasonably be 
expected to bear the burden of an additional $20 cost so that each 
worker can avoid a mortality risk imposition that is equivalent to 
bearing a cost over four times as great ($90).  Thus, although the 
total cost of regulation is unchanged from Chromium (200,000), 
equity here dictates a different regulatory result by virtue of how 
the cost is distributed. 
This shows that, when evaluating the regulation of 
workplace risks from the standpoint of equity, what matters is an 
individual-level comparison between the amount each cost-bearer 
would have to pay to subsidize regulation and the amount each 
risk-bearer would be willing to pay for the risk reduction the 
regulation accomplishes.  Because equity is a norm concerned 
with the burdens and benefits experienced by each affected 
individual,269 rather than burdens and benefits considered in the 
aggregate, the type of comparison made in standard, VSL-based 
CBA tells us nothing about whether a given regulation will or will 
not promote equity.270  The reason aggressive regulation would 
be inequitable in Chromium (200,000) was not that its $20 million 
incremental cost exceeded its $9 million incremental benefit, but 
rather that the $200 cost burden experienced by each consumer 
exceeded the $90 each worker would be willing to pay for the 
resulting risk reduction.  When, in Chromium (1.1 million), the 
same $20 million cost is distributed among a group of consumers 
ten times as large, aggressive regulation becomes the equitable 
result because the cost burden to each consumer falls to $20.  The 
comparison captured by standard VSL-based CBA—one between 
a regulation’s total cost and the total amount risk-bearers would 
collectively be willing to pay for the risk reduction the regulation 
accomplishes—is irrelevant from the standpoint of equity. 
But is this sort of comparison relevant from the standpoint 
of some other norm?  One might think that a comparison between 
a regulation’s total cost and total monetized benefit would be 
269. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
270. See supra Part I.A (explaining the comparisons made in the VSL calculations).
2018 MORAL CONTEXT 293 
relevant to the norm of overall well-being.  After all, if a 
regulation’s total cost exceeds its total monetized benefit, doesn’t 
this show that overall well-being would be reduced were the 
regulation enacted?  For reasons explained above in Part II.B, it 
does not.  Standard CBA captures the welfare effects of the 
regulation’s monetary cost and the regulation’s ex ante risk 
reduction benefit reasonably well.271  It fails, however, to 
persuasively capture the welfare effect of the regulation’s ex post 
death avoidance benefit.272  For this reason, whether or not a given 
regulation is cost-justified under VSL-based CBA is a poor 
indicator of whether it would increase or decrease overall well-
being on net. 
Thus, where the regulation of workplace risks is concerned, 
the dictates of standard, VSL-based CBA have little normative 
significance.  As the above analysis of Chromium (1.1 million) 
illustrates, a workplace risk regulation that is not cost-justified 
might still be morally justifiable on the basis of equity or overall 
well-being.273  Although standard CBA does not reliably track 
any norm, an individual-level comparison between each cost-
bearer’s share of regulatory costs and each risk-bearer’s risk-
reduction benefit at least provides a reliable indication of what the 
norm of equity would dictate in a given case.  This suggests that, 
where workplace risks are concerned, CBA should be modified 
to focus on the type of comparison contemplated by the individual 
risk principle: a comparison between the amount each cost-bearer 
would have to pay to subsidize a given regulation and the amount 
each risk-bearer would be willing to pay for the risk reduction the 
regulation delivers.  When regulators consider how stringently to 
regulate a workplace mortality risk, this sort of comparison will 
indicate when further regulation would be inequitable.  
Individualized CBA reliably tracks the norm of equity.  By 
contrast, when it comes to workplace risks, standard CBA is a 
decision procedure in search of a normative basis. 
271. See supra Part II.B.
272. See supra Part II.B.
273. See supra text accompanying note 260.
294 ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW Vol.  71:1 
CONCLUSION 
In this article, I have argued for the importance of taking 
moral context into account in regulating industrial mortality risks.  
Making mortality risk regulation sensitive to moral context means 
distinguishing sharply between cases in which the costs of 
regulation are borne by the same people who are exposed to the 
risk (consumption risks) and cases in which such costs are borne 
by others (workplace risks).  Where consumption risks are 
concerned, the norm of personal autonomy provides a basis for 
using the VSL as a guide for risk regulation.  In this moral context, 
following the dictates of standard, VSL-based CBA ensures that 
each risk-bearer is made to invest as much, but no more, in their 
own safety as they would rationally wish to.  Where workplace 
risks are concerned, the norm of equity provides a basis for using 
individual willingness-to-pay, though not the VSL, as a guide for 
risk regulation.  In that moral context, standard VSL-based CBA 
has no clear normative basis and should be subordinate to the 
individualized form of CBA represented by the individual risk 
principle. 
What consumption risks and workplace risks have in 
common is that in both cases risk-bearers benefit meaningfully 
from the industrial activity that creates the risk.  This shapes the 
moral context in two important ways.  First, it makes the risk 
imposition itself morally defensible on the grounds that the 
imposition works to the ex ante advantage of those imperiled.  
Second, in cases where risk-bearers do not bear the costs of 
regulation, it provides a moral basis for limiting regulatory costs 
in an equitable manner. 
Unlike consumption and workplace risks, environmental 
risks often fall on persons who neither benefit meaningfully from 
the industrial activity giving rise to the risk nor bear any 
appreciable share of the costs of reducing the risk.  For example, 
the subsistence fishermen exposed to a small risk of death from 
eating fish filled with toxic chemicals deposited into fishing 
streams by nearby paper and pulp mills may not benefit in any 
meaningful way from the activity of paper production.274  Two 
274. See generally National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants for
Source Category: Pulp and Paper Production, 63 Fed. Reg. 18,504 (Apr. 15, 1998) (to be 
codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 63, 261, 430). 
2018 MORAL CONTEXT 295 
basic questions arise in this moral context.  First, under what 
circumstances if any is it morally permissible to impose a risk of 
death on one group of people for the sake of providing a benefit 
to a different group of people?  Second, assuming there are 
circumstances in which it permissible to imperil the lives of some 
in order to benefit others, is it morally defensible to use the VSL 
or willingness-to-pay as a guide for risk regulation in such 
circumstances? 
In future work, I hope to take up these questions.  
Tentatively, while it is possible to conceive of circumstances in 
which it would be morally permissible to impose a risk of death 
on some for the sake of benefitting others, it is far from clear that 
these circumstances actually obtain in the case of most 
environmental risks.  And even where such circumstances do 
hold, using a VSL or the general concept of willingness-to-pay to 
guide risk regulation would not seem to be defensible on the basis 
of overall well-being, personal autonomy, equity, or any other 
norm. 
